The great leap. Turkey under Erdogan. OSW Point of View 51, 27 May 2015 by Matusiak, Marek
5 1
M a r e k  M a t u s i a k
T h e  g r e a T  l e a p  
T u r k e y  u n d e r  e r d o g a n
NUMBER 51
WARSAW
MAY 2015
The greaT leap
TURkEY UNdER ERdogAN 
 
Marek Matusiak
© Copyright by ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich
im. Marka karpia / Centre for Eastern Studies
Content editors
Adam Eberhardt, krzysztof Strachota
Editor
katarzyna kazimierska
Co-operation
Halina kowalczyk, Anna Łabuszewska
Translation
Ilona duchnowicz
Co-operation
Nicholas Furnivall
graphic design 
PARA-BUCH
dTP 
groupMedia
Photograph on cover 
Shutterstock
PUBlISHER
Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich im. Marka Karpia 
Centre for Eastern Studies
ul. koszykowa 6a, Warsaw, Poland
Phone + 48 /22/ 525 80 00
Fax: + 48 /22/ 525 80 40
osw.waw.pl
ISBN 978-83-62936-63-2
Contents
MAIN PoINTS /5
I. THE WAxINg ANd WANINg oF THE kEMAlIST REPUBlIC  /8
II. THE AkP EPoCH – FRoM dEMoCRACY To AUToCRACY /14
III. oN THE RoAd To dEMoCRACY /21
IV. THE TURkISH CIvIlISATIoNAl lEAP /27
V. oN THE RoAd To AUToCRACY /31
VI. TURkEY’S CIvIlISATIoNAl IdENTITY UNdER AkP RUlE  /38
VII. THE TURkISH PUBlIC UNdER AkP RUlE /42
VIII. CoNClUSIoNS ANd FoRECASTS /44
APPENdIx /47
1. The Fethullah Gulen Movement (Cemaat) /47
2. The arrests on 17 December 2013 /50
3. Ergenekon and Balyoz /51
P
O
IN
T 
O
F 
V
IE
W
  0
5/
20
15
5
Main points
•	 Before	 the	 Justice	and	Development	Party	 (AKP)	 took	power	
in	2002,	Turkey	was	a	country	which	couldn’t	be	measured	by	
Western	political	standards	due	to	the	role	the	army	played	in	
the	state,	the	radical	nationalist	state	ideology	and	the	degree	
of	internal	instability.	The	AKP,	a	grouping	with	Islamic	roots	
and	a	pro-European	manifesto,	gained	a	strong	political	man-
date	and	was	thus	able	to	thoroughly	redefine	the	guidelines	
of	Turkey’s	politics;	 in	 effect,	 it	 changed	Turkey’s	politics	 ir-
reversibly.	The	state	based	on	secular	elites	representing	mili-
tary	and	state	administration	circles	and	on	a	secular-nation-
alist	 ideology	which	existed	 from	1923,	has	 to	a	great	extent	
moved	into	the	past.
•	 The	reforms	launched	by	the	AKP	offered	Turkey	a	chance	to	
become	part	of	the	West	as	regards	legal	and	political	stand-
ards,	 while	 maintaining	 its	 cultural	 and	 religious	 distinct-
ness.	The	AKP’s	rule	gave	the	country	nearly	a	decade	of	social	
peace,	political	stability,	growing	prosperity,	the	development	
of	democracy	and	the	rule	of	law.	
•	 However,	as	the	AKP	has	been	gaining	in	strength,	it	has	demon-
strated	to	the	West	with	growing	assertiveness	the	distinctness	
of	the	Turkish	state	model	and	civilisational	identity.	In	turn,	the	
system	of	government	has	been	turning	more	and	more	into	the	
personal	rule	of	Recep	Tayyip	Erdogan	(first	as	prime	minister	
and	then	as	president).	With	time	Erdogan’s	rule	has	become	in-
creasingly	 disrespectful	 to	 the	 state’s	 legal	 and	 political	 order,	
and	has	gagged	and	repressed	his	critics.	This	has	greatly	blem-
ished	the	AKP’s	previous	achievements,	has	led	to	the	erosion	of	
the	state’s	constitutional	order	and	has	created	the	image	of	Tur-
key	as	an	authoritarian,	unpredictable	and	unreliable	state.	
•	 Since	 Erdogan	 became	 president	 in	 August	 2014,	 the	 Turk-
ish	state	and	political	system	have	been	based	on	the	will	of	
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a	 single	man	whose	 power	 is	 not	 unlimited	 but	who	 is	 still	
strong	 enough	not	 to	meet	 any	 open	 resistance.	 Despite	 the	
emancipation	efforts	made	by	Prime	Minister	Ahmet	Davuto-
glu,	who	is	the	constitutional	head	of	the	executive,	Erdogan	
remains	the	keystone	of	the	existing	order	and	the	central	de-
cision-maker	as	regards	political	and	state	issues.	The	reform	
and	pro-European	policy	can	be	resumed	only	if	he	decides	it	
should	be,	and	this	highly	unlikely	given	the	logic	of	the	con-
solidation	of	power,	the	scale	of	abuse	committed	already	and	
personality	features.	
•	 Turkey’s	internal	situation	remains	relatively	stable,	the	mac-
roeconomic	 results	 are	good,	 and	 the	political	 supremacy	of	
the	AKP	and	 the	president	 seem	 to	be	unchallengeable.	The	
authoritarian	practices	have	so	far	not	resulted in	a	substan-
tial	drop	in	approval	ratings.	However,	there	is	increasing	evi-
dence	that	Turkey	is	about	to	turn	a	corner.	The	country’s	re-
sults	are	continually	less	impressive	both	domestically	and	on	
the	international	arena.	The	government’s	policy	is	focused	on	
protecting	its	power	and	fighting	real	and	imagined	enemies.	
Social	sentiments	are	deteriorating,	the	polarisation	of	views	
is	 escalating	 and	more	 and	more	 violent	 incidents	 in	 socio-
political	life	have	been	seen.	Turkey’s	geographic	proximity	to	
Syria	and	its	involvement	in	the	conflict	there	pose	the	threat	
that	instability	could	spill	over	into	Turkey’s	territory.	
•	 It	is	difficult	to	make	any	forecasts	regarding	Turkey’s	socio-
political	 future.	The	previous	 state	model	was	disassembled	
and	cannot	be	reinstated.	The	project	aimed	at	bringing	Tur-
key	closer	to	the	European	Union	will	certainly	not	be	resumed	
as	long	as	the	AKP	remains	in	power.	The	governance	model	
built	by	President	Recep	Tayyip	Erdogan	 is	bringing	Turkey	
closer	 to	 countries	 like	 Russia.	 However,	 given	 the	 scale	 of	
internal	 diversity	 inside	 Turkey	 and	 the	 growing	 social	 po-
larisation,	 it	does	not	 seem	sustainable	 in	 the	 long	 run.	The	
stance	which	the	Turkish	public	takes	will	decide	on	Turkey’s	
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future	and	 its	political	 and	civilisational	 identity.	Their	val-
ues,	aspirations	and	needs	are,	however,	extremely	difficult	to	
determine.	Public	opinion	polls	and	everyday	experience	have	
given	grounds	for	formulating	a	number	of	mutually	contra-
dictory	theses.	
•	 The	parliamentary	 election	 is	 scheduled	 for	 7	 June	 2015	 and	
the	scale	of	 the	AKP’s	victory	will	 serve	as	a	key	prognostic	
for	the	future	development	of	the	political	situation	in	Turkey.	
If	the	party’s	result	is	close	to	what	it	achieved	in	2011	(49.8%),	
this	would	confirm	that	there	is	no	alternative	for	the	AKP	and	
would	make	President	Erdogan	intensify	his	efforts	to	change	
the	political	 system	by	constitutional	means.	A	significantly	
lower	result,	for	example	around	40%,	would	block	the	plans	
for	 the	political	 system	reform,	and	 in	an	extreme	situation	
could	make	the	AKP	lose	the	parliamentary	majority	which	al-
lows	the	party	to	be	self-reliant.	This	scenario	would	certainly	
result	in	increasing	political	tension	resulting	from	the	imbal-
ance	between	President	Erdogan’s	personal	ambitions	and	the	
strength	of	the	government	party’s	mandate.	This	would	lead	
to	an	escalation	of	social	tension,	divides	within	the	party	and	
a	long-term	erosion	of	the	AKP’s	power.	
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i. the waxing and waning of the KeMalist 
Republic 
The	Republic	of	Turkey	was	proclaimed	in	1923,	born	out	of	the	de-
feat	of	the	Ottoman	Empire	in	World	War	I	and	the	subsequent	vic-
tory	of	the	massive	resistance	movement	led	by	General	Mustafa	
Kemal	(he	named	himself	Ataturk	in	1934)	in	the	war	against	for-
eign	intervention	(mainly	Greek	and	French).	
The	Sèvres	Peace	Treaty	(1920)	dictated	by	the	Allied	powers,	pro-
vided	for	the	partition	of	the	greater	part	of	the	Ottoman	Empire	
and	imposed	on	Turkey	the	role	of	a	rump	state	deprived	of	sov-
ereignty.	The	victory	of	the	forces	led	by	Mustafa	Kemal,	which	
rejected	the	dictate	of	the	Western	powers	and	at	the	same	time	
refused	 obedience	 to	 the	 Ottoman	 government	 in	 Istanbul,	 al-
lowed	Turkey	to	maintain	sovereignty	and	defend	its	territories	
in	Asia	Minor	(the	cradle	of	the	Ottoman	Empire),	eastern	Thrace	
and	a	scrap	of	the	Middle	East.	
The	movement’s	 leaders	believed	that	the	Ottoman	Empire’s	de-
feat	in	World	War	I	and	also	in	the	previous	wars	in	the	Balkans	
and	Libya	were	in	part	caused	by	the	civilisational	backwardness	
and	“moral	decay”	of	the	empire,	which	in	their	opinion	were	an	
effect	 of	 the	 feudal	 socio-political	 system,	 the	Muslim	 religious	
obscurantism	and	the	multi-ethnic	nature	of	the	state.	
The	Ottoman	Empire	ruled	by	a	sultan	caliph	was	replaced	with	
the	Republic	of	Turkey,	a	Turkish	secular	national	state	which	had	
been	dispossessed	of	a	great	part	of	its	territory	and	a	huge	part	of	
its	non-Muslim	population1.	This	meant	the	end	of	the	old	order	
1	 As	 a	 consequence	 of	 the	 loss	 of	 Arab	 territories,	 the	 Armenian	 Geno-
cide	 in	 1915	 and	 the	 exchange	 of	 population	with	Greece.	 It	 also	 needs	
to	be	emphasised	that	in	Ottoman	times	and	at	the	dawn	of	the	Repub-
lic	 ‘Turkishness’	was	a	kind	of	confessional-cultural-state	identity,	and	
many	representatives	of	the	new	state’s	elites	were	of	Kurdish,	Slavonic,	
Circassian	and	Albanian	background.	It	was	not	until	republican	times	
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and	 the	beginning	of	 a	 top-down,	 ideologised,	uncompromising	
and	at	times	brutal	reconstruction	of	the	country.	It	was	contem-
porary	to	the	Bolshevik	revolution	in	Russia	and	equalled	it	in	the	
profundity	of	the	changes	it	introduced	in	such	areas	as:	state	or-
ganisation,	culture,	lifestyle,	attitudes	towards	religion,	etc.	
The	new	government,	capitalising	on	the	legitimacy	it	had	gained	
through	the	victory	in	the	war,	deliberately	and	consistently	broke	
the	historical	continuity.	Contrary	to	the	intentions	of	the	Muslim	
population	of	Anatolia,	who	had	resisted	the	foreign	intervention	
defending	their	faith	and	the	old	order,	the	six	centuries	old	legacy	
of	the	Ottoman	Empire	was	rejected	in	the	identity,	political,	reli-
gious	and	linguistic	aspects2.	These	were	replaced	with	‘Kemalist’	
ideology	 based	 on	 Westernisation,	 secularism,	 Turkish	 nation-
alism	and	the	cult	of	Mustafa	Kemal	himself	 (which	took	on	an	
increasingly	 semi-religious	 incarnation	over	 time).	At	 the	 same	
time,	systematic	modernisation	efforts	were	made.	The	army	was	
put	on	guard	of	the	new	state	and	its	ideological	foundations,	and	
it	employed	military	measures	to	crush	the	resistance	against	the	
new	order.	
Turkey’s	status	as	a	frontline	state	in	the	Cold	War	in	the	second	
half	 of	 the	 20th	 century	 has	 contributed	 to	 a	 further	 consolida-
tion	 of	 the	 primacy	 of	 the	 Kemalist	 military,	 administrational	
and	judicial	establishment	in	the	life	of	the	state.	Even	though	the	
that	 ‘Turkishness’	 became	 redefined	 as	 an	 ethno-cultural	 (but	 not	 ra-
cial)	identity.	
2	 As	a	consequence	of	 the	 thorough	 language	reforms	 implemented	 in	Tur-
key	 throughout	 the	 20th	 century,	 the	 historical	 Ottoman	 language	 –	 the	
language	of	the	upper	classes,	which	was	used	in	documents	and	literature	
–	 is	 comprehensible	only	 to	a	very	 limited	extent	 to	a	 speaker	of	modern	
Turkish.	This	is	an	effect	of	the	change	of	alphabet	from	Arabic	to	Latin,	to	
changes	 in	grammar	and	to	 the	consistent	removal	of	Arabic	and	Persian	
words	from	the	language,	replacing	them	with	neologisms.	One	illustration	
of	the	scale	of	the	changes	is	the	fact	that	even	Ataturk’s	manifesto	speeches	
and	his	canonical	quotations	originating	from	the	1920s	and	1930s	written	
on	public	buildings	have	been	modernised	on	a	regular	basis	throughout	the	
twentieth	century	to	make	them	understandable	to	ordinary	citizens.	
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single-party	regime	which	had	been	introduced	upon	the	setting	
up	of	the	republic,	ended	in	1950,	the	army	in	fact	controlled	the	
subsequent	cabinets	until	 the	end	of	 the	20th	century	using	for-
mal	and	informal	measures.	It	stood	above	current	politics,	and	at	
the	same	time	reserved	the	right	to	intervene	and/or	suspend	the	
constitutional	order	(the	coups	in	1960	and	1980,	and	the	forced	
government	dismissals	in	1971	and	1997).
The	strict	secularity	of	the	state,	the	nonreligious	lifestyle	as	a	pro-
moted	cultural	standard	and	the	pro-Western	geopolitical	orien-
tation	(NATO	membership	and	aspirations	 to	 join	the	European	
Economic	Community)	all	brought	Turkey	closer	to	the	Western	
world.	At	the	same	time,	in	terms	of	domestic	policy,	Turkey	re-
mained	distant	 from	the	West	The	Kemalist	establishment	pro-
fessed	nationalism	as	part	of	the	state’s	manifesto,	was	convinced	
of	the	inviolability	of	Turkish	sovereignty	and	strongly	suspicious	
about	the	external	world3,	and	did	not	want	any	major	changes.
The	 factors	which	 kept	 Turkey	 distant	 from	 the	West	 included	
the	role	of	 the	army	 in	politics,	 the	militarisation	of	public	 life,	
the	brutality	and	the	impunity	of	the	state	apparatus,	violence	in	
socio-political	life	(including	left-wing	and	right-wing	terrorism)	
and	the	scale	of	internal	cultural	and	class	differences4.	One	effect	
of	the	extremely	nationalist	state	ideology5	was	the	fact	that	the	
system	discriminated	against	 and	persecuted	groups	which	did	
3	 Turkish	political	writings	reveal	that	suspiciousness	of	the	external	world	
and	the	tendency	to	believe	conspiracy	theories	has	been	characteristic	of	
a	great	part	of	Turkish	state	elites,	including	the	present	ones.	This	is	some-
times	determined	as	‘Sèvres	syndrome’,	as	a	reference	to	the	treaty	the	Ot-
toman	Empire	was	forced	to	sign	after	World	War	I.	
4	 Symbolised	by	the	division	into	Westernised	‘White	Turks’	mainly	from	Is-
tanbul,	Ankara	and	 Izmir,	who	are	political	 and	economic	 leaders	versus	
the	conservative	‘Black	Turks’	from	central	Anatolia	who	are	usually	worse	
educated	and	in	fact	underprivileged.
5	 The	 song,	Türkiyem,	 contains	 the	 essence	of	 this.	 It	was	written	on	order	
from	the	military	regime	after	the	1980	coup	and	was	frequently	broadcast	
on	the	radio	and	TV	at	that	time.	Pursuant	to	instructions	from	the	generals	
who	led	the	coup,	this	melody	was	used	in	prisons	at	the	time	of	interroga-
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not	fit	 in	with	 the	model	of	 citizen	resulting	 from	 the	Kemalist	
ideology:	a	secularised	or	moderately	religious	Sunni	Turk.	
The	 ‘deep	state’	 (derin devlet),	a	network	of	 secret,	 informal	and	
mutually	autonomous	groups	of	 representatives	of	military	and	
civilian	 elites,	 is	 a	 phenomenon	 which	 remains	 a	 mystery	 to	
a	great	extent.	 ‘Deep	state’	units	were	 initially	 formed	 for	mili-
tary	purposes:	for	organised	resistance	and	sabotage	in	the	event	
of	Soviet	aggression.	However,	over	time	they	in	fact	turned	into	
political	and	ideological	groups	protecting	the	secular	and	nation-
alist	nature	of	the	state	and	their	own	privileged	position	in	the	
state.	Political	violence	(involving	murders,	terrorist	attacks	and	
acts	 of	 incitement)	was	used	 extensively	 in	 addition	 to	 behind-
the-scenes	moves	to	achieve	these	goals.	
The	coup	in	1980	and	the	subsequent	direct	military	rule	marked	the	
apogee	of	the	state	model	based	on	the	army.	500,000	people	(repre-
senting	a	full	spectrum	of	views)	were	arrested,	50	people	were	of-
ficially	executed	and	600	more	died	in	unclear	circumstances.	
The	late	1980s	and	early	1990s	brought	a	change	in	the	conditions	
in	which	Turkey	had	functioned	from	the	end	of	World	War	II	(the	
tions	and	torture.	In	2010,	one	of	the	victims	of	the	coup	bought	the	copy-
right	to	this	song	and	banned	it	being	played	ever	again:	
Treason has pervaded my heroic race
There is suffering and hatred in all hearts
My enemies are not valiant, they are cowards
A Turk may not have other friend and patron but another Turk 
Let’s rejoice at the principles our Father [Ataturk] gave us 
Let’s run towards the purposes he showed us
Turkey, Turkey, my paradise
My unequalled nation
My Father, leader of Turkishness and youth
This great fatherland is your achievement
We, the whole nation, are following in Your footsteps, enjoying the love 
Live long Republic, our dearest Fatherland! 
Cf.	http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AmXj0ZHEgvE	
http://www.radikal.com.tr/turkiye/darbenin_sarkisina_en_agir_darbe-954104	
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Cold	War	ended,	increased	efforts	to	join	the	EEC	were	made	and	
international	economic	co-operation	was	developing).	The	1990s	
–	as	can	be	seen	from	the	present	perspective	–	marked	the	be-
ginning	of	a	 long	and	convulsive	end	of	 the	previously	existing	
political	and	state	order.	As	opposed	to	what	happened	in	Central	
Europe,	which	enjoyed	its	regained	sovereignty	and	made	efforts	
to	integrate	with	Western	Europe,	the	1990s	was	a	lost	decade	for	
Turkey.	The	country	was	plunging	into	 internal	 instability6	and	
political7	and	financial	crisis8.	In	effect,	Turkey	entered	the	new	
millennium	with	a	pauperised	society,	a	disgraced	political	class,	
a	powerful	army	(but	still	degenerated	due	to	its	political	engage-
ment	and	the	lack	of	supervision)9	and	with	an	increasingly	hol-
low	republican	state	ideology.	
The	 snap	 election	 held	 in	 2002	was	 a	 turning	 point.	 The	 army	
did	not	conceal	 its	 ire	when	the	election	was	won	by	the	Justice	
and	Development	Party	(AKP)	which	had	been	formed	a	year	ear-
lier	 and	 drew	 upon	 the	 tradition	 of	 political	 Islam.	 The	 voting	
6	 The	 intensified	 activity	 of	 the	 armed	 and	 terrorist	Kurdish	underground	
forces	(PKK),	the	escalation	of	radical	Islamic	sentiments	(e.g.	the	massacre	
of	Alevis	 in	Sivas	 in	 July	 1993)	and	 the	 still	unresolved	murders	of	public	
persons	and	terrorist	attacks.	
7	 The	prime	minister	 changed	eight	 times	between	 1989	and	2001	 (without	
taking	into	account	government	reconstruction).	In	1997,	the	army	brought	
down	the	government	for	the	fourth	time	in	the	Republic’s	history,	this	time	
without	bringing	 tanks	 to	 the	streets	and	without	 introducing	a	military	
regime,	but	instead	with	pressure	from	the	republican	establishment:	the	
army,	 the	 senior	 state	 officials,	 the	media	 and	non-governmental	 organi-
sations.
8	 The	financial	 crises	 in	 1994,	 1999,	and	 the	one	which	especially	painfully	
affected	the	public	–	in	2001,	“so-called”	black	Wednesday.	Annual	GDP	fell	
by:	4.7%,	 3.4%	and	5.7%	respectively	 (World	Bank	data).	 In	2001,	over	one	
million	 jobs	were	 liquidated,	wages	were	 reduced	 by	 20%,	 and	 the	 Turk-
ish	currency	lost	40%	of	 its	value.	 In	1990–1999,	the	average	annual	 infla-
tion	rate	 in	Turkey	was	78%.	Cf.	http://www.imf.org/external/np/speech-
es/2003/082903.htm
9	 For	example,	the	‘Susurluk	incident’	in	1996,	when	a	high-ranking	police	of-
ficer	from	Istanbul,	a	Kurdish	MP	and	a	contract	killer	linked	to	the	radical	
right	terrorist	organisation	known	as	the	Grey	Wolves	were	discovered	to	
be	travelling	in	one	car	when	it	crashed.	
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regulations	 then	 in	 force	 and	 the	 fragmentation	of	 the	political	
scene	played	into	the	AKP’s	hands.	As	much	as	46%	of	the	votes	in	
the	election	were	cast	for	parties	which	did	not	manage	to	reach	
the	10%	electoral	threshold.	This	meant	that	the	AKP,	with	a	34%	
support	level,	gained	66%	of	the	seats.	None	of	the	parties	repre-
sented	in	the	previous	term	entered	parliament.	This	spelt	the	end	
of	many	groupings	which	had	been	dominant	on	the	Turkish	po-
litical	scene	for	decades.	Had	the	election	threshold	been	5%	and	
not	10%,	and	had	seven	and	not	two	parties	entered	parliament,	
Turkey’s	political	contemporary	history	would	undoubtedly	have	
looked	different.	
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ii. the aKp epoch – fRoM deMocRacy  
to autocRacy
The	 Justice	 and	Development	 Party	 has	 ruled	 Turkey	 by	 itself	
without	 interruption	 since	 its	 first	 electoral	 victory	 in	 2002.	
As	 its	monopoly	on	power	has	been	 strengthening	 throughout	
years,	the	AKP’s	policy	has	undergone	major	changes.	Not	only	
has	its	political	zeal	failed	to	slacken,	 it	has	in	fact	been	steer-
ing	the	country	into	newer	and	ever	more	unknown	waters.	The	
changes	have	been	made	in	Turkey	under	the	AKP’s	rule	and	are	
momentous	 and	 to	 a	 great	 extent	 irreversible.	 The	 process	 of	
transformation	process	 still	 seems	 far	 from	over.	For	 this	 rea-
son,	 it	 is	 difficult	 to	 provide	 clear	 diagnoses	 and	 forecasts	 for	
Turkey’s	political	reality.	
To	put	it	in	simple	terms,	the	first	stage	of	the	AKP’s	rule,	which	
lasted	around	one	decade,	brought	Turkey	unprecedented	reform	
in	the	spirit	of	EU	standards,	a	rapid	modernisation	and	growing	
prosperity.	The	AKP’s	achieved	its	ultimate	victory	in	its	rivalry	
with	the	army	for	influence	in	the	state	around	2012	and	this	made	
it	possible	for	the	first	time	in	Turkey’s	history	to	establish	civil-
ian	control	over	the	armed	forces10.	This	put	an	end	to	the	primacy	
the	Kemalist	 state-establishment	 and	 of	 the	 secular-nationalist	
ideology	as	regards	political	choices	and	the	values	shared	by	the	
Turkish	public.	In	2005,	Ankara	embarked	upon	accession	nego-
tiations	with	the	EU.	After	a	decade	of	the	AKP’s	rule,	the	Republic	
of	Turkey	reached	its	historic	peak	in	terms	of	prestige,	position	
and	influence.	
10	 This	 process	 was	 sealed	 by	 the	 amendment	 of	 article	 35	 of	 the	 internal	
regulations	of	 the	Turkish	Armed	Forces	 (Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri Iç Hizmet 
Kanunu)	 in	 July	2013,	 imposing	on	the	army	the	obligation	“to	protect	and	
defend	the	Turkish	fatherland	as	defined	by	the	constitution	of	the	Republic	
of	Turkey.”	This	provision	was	recognised	by	the	army	as	its	formal	title	to	
become	engaged	in	politics.	
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The	 second	 stage,	 especially	 following	 the	 anti-governmental	
street	protests	in	2013,	has	been	characterised	by	a	massive	step	
backwards	as	regards	the	rule	of	law	and	democratic	standards,	
and	by	consistent	efforts	to	redefine	the	state	identity	as	neo-im-
perial	and	conservative-Islamic.	Turkey	has	made	ever	more	fre-
quent	hints	that	in	spite	of	its	NATO	membership	it,	like	for	exam-
ple	Russia,	has	a	revisionist	approach	towards	the	present	global	
order.	Even	though,	pursuant	to	the	constitution,	Turkey	is	a	par-
liamentary-cabinet	democracy,	since	the	presidential	election	in	
2014,	the	state	has	been	governed	by	President	Recep	Tayyip	Er-
dogan,	who	has	disregarded	any	restrictions	imposed	by	the	law	
and	the	political	system,	and	has	openly	employed	the	state	appa-
ratus	to	combat	his	opponents.	The	political	system	being	formed	
in	Turkey	can	be	branded	–	as	one	former	AKP	member	has	put	it	–	
an	“authoritarian	Islamist	majoritarianism”11.	Everything	seems	
to	indicate	that,	under	Recep	Tayyip	Erdogan’s	rule	(and	there	are	
no	alternatives	at	present),	Turkey	will	move	increasingly	further	
away	from	the	West	in	terms	of	domestic	and	foreign	policy.	
It	 is	 impossible	 to	find	a	clear	answer	 to	 the	question	as	 to	why	
the	AKP	has	changed	its	policy	and	when	this	took	place	precisely.	
One	theory	is	popular	amongst	the	AKP’s	critics;	it	suggests	that	
the	reforms	conducted	by	the	party	from	the	very	beginning	were	
only	 instruments	 to	 be	 employed	 in	 the	 process	 of	 taking	 over	
power,	abolishing	the	old	order	and	turning	Turkey	back	from	its	
way	Westwards.	This,	however,	is	a	gross	oversimplification.	The	
present	political	vector	is	more	an	effect	of	a	number	of	objective,	
situation-based	and	personal	factors	which	together	led	the	AKP	
to	reveal	the	dark	side	of	its	potential	(that,	at	least,	would	be	the	
Western	viewpoint).	The	scenario	being	implemented	at	present	–	
even	though	it	was	possible	to	imagine	in	2002	–	was	not	the	only	
possible	one,	nor	was	it	inevitable.	
11	 Cf.	https://www.todayszaman.com/columnist/suat-kiniklioglu/gul-and-the-	-
end-of-the-golden-era_356233.html	
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While	 looking	 for	 the	 sources	 of	 the	 AKP’s	 present	 policy,	 one	
should	bear	in	mind	that:	
a)	 Since	the	beginning	of	the	21st	century,	the	West’s	ability	to	im-
pose	its	standards	on	the	rest	of	the	world	has	been	steadily	
weakening	as	a	consequence	of	a	set	of	political,	economic	and	
technological	factors.	
b)	 Turkey	is	a	country	with	an	imperial	past,	a	large	demographic	
and	economic	potential	and	a	strategic	geographical	location.	At	
the	same	time,	 its	culture	and	history	makes	 its	distant	from	
both	Europe	and	the	Arab	Middle	East.	All	this	has	as	a	natural	
consequence	pushed	Turkey	to	seek	an	identity	of	its	own	and	
a	role	as	an	independent	entity	in	international	relations.
c)	 The	attempt	to	totally	reject	the	Ottoman	legacy	and	replace	it	
with	a	relatively	shallow	Kemalist	ideology	has	resulted	in	an	
identity	crisis	in	modern-day	Turkey	(which	is	masked	by	ag-
gressive	nationalist	rhetoric).	The	end	of	the	Cold	War,	which	
had	defined	Turkey’s	place	for	almost	40	years,	and	the	burn-
out	of	the	state	ideology	required	a	new	answer	to	the	question	
concerning	 the	 state’s	 identity,	 its	 attitude	 towards	 its	 own	
past	and	position	in	the	world.	
d)	 When	the	AKP	came	to	power,	Kemalism	was	in	fact	an	empty	
form.	A	set	of	emotions	and	mental	stereotypes,	and	the	cult	of	
Ataturk	was	all	that	remained	of	it;	and	even	then	it	was	only	as	
the	father	of	the	nation	and	a	hero	rather	than	the	author	of	ide-
as	which	could	be	used	as	a	signpost	for	the	future.	The	defence	
of	the	previous	ideological	order	by	the	secular	part	of	society	
was	to	a	great	extent	a	manifestation	of	the	defence	of	the	group	
interest	or	fear	that	the	religious	right	could	take	power.	
e)	 The	1980	coup	and	the	years	of	the	military	regime	inflicted	
deep	trauma	on	Turkish	society.	While	in	the	1960s,	and	espe-
cially	in	the	1970s,	the	Turkish	public	was	strongly	engaged	in	
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politics,	the	experience	of	political	repressions	after	1980	and	
the	simultaneous	development	of	consumption-oriented	capi-
talism	(being	an	effect	of	the	liberal	economic	reforms	carried	
out	in	the	1980s)	made	a	great	section	of	the	Turkish	public	lose	
interest	in	any	forms	of	political	or	public	engagement12.	Fur-
thermore,	the	turbulent	1990s	and	the	high	election	threshold	
decimated	 the	diversity	on	 the	Turkish	party	political	 scene	
in	the	election	in	2002.	In	effect,	the	AKP	has	in	fact	had	no	
political	competitors	until	present,	and	the	Turkish	public	is	
predominantly	 interested	 in	 issues	concerning	everyday	 life	
rather	 than	 political	 standards.	 As	 Kemal	 Kilicdaroglu,	 the	
leader	of	 the	main	opposition	grouping,	 the	Republican	Peo-
ple’s	Party	(CHP),	has	admitted	“democracy	and	the	freedom	
of	 the	media	are	 issues	 for	 intellectualists	 and	not	ordinary	
citizens”13.	
f)	 The	process	of	pro-European	reforms	and	the	liberalisation	of	
the	political	system	in	the	first	decade	of	the	AKP’s	rule	were	
used	as	an	instrument	for	gaining	sovereign	power	in	the	state	
and	enabling	the	expression	of	a	religious-conservative	iden-
tity.	Since	the	goal	to	gain	absolute	power	was	achieved,	the	
determination	to	continue	political	reform	weakened.	In	turn,	
the	fact	that	France	and	Germany	blocked	accession	negotia-
tions	with	the	EU,	the	economic	and	political	weakening	of	the	
European	Union	and	Turkey’s	sensitivity	to	the	use	of	double	
standards	with	regard	to	Muslims	in	socio-political	life	made	
the	Turkish	government	strongly	disillusioned	with	the	idea	
of	European	integration.	
g)	 The	first	decade	of	the	AKP’s	rule	was	a	clear	success	in	terms	of	
internal	affairs	and	economic	and	foreign	policy.	This	offered	
12	 Cf.	http://www.academia.edu/3462506/Necessary_conformism_An_art_
of_living_for_young_people_in_Turkey_NPT_
13	 Cf.	http://www.taraf.com.tr/politika/kilicdaroglu-secimde-hedefimiz-
yuzde-35/#	
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the	government	growing	public	support	and	improved	its	in-
ternational	position.	Furthermore,	as	a	natural	consequence,	
this	made	Ankara	more	 assertive	 and	 it	 finally	 resisted	 the	
West’s	arrogation	of	the	right	to	tell	Turkey	what	it	should	and	
should	not	do.	
h)	 The	special	characteristics	of	the	Turkish	public	–	the	cult	of	
the	leader	and	the	patriarchal	culture	–	have	favoured	strong,	
charismatic	leaders	at	the	expense	of	conciliatory	politicians	
and	has	contributed	to	the	government’s	authoritarian	behav-
iour	being	accepted.	 Initially,	Erdogan	was	only	one	of	a	tri-
umvirate	in	the	AKP.	He	was	the	most	charismatic	one,	but	he	
also	was	the	least	experienced	in	politics	on	the	central	level	
and	had	a	clearly	weaker	personnel	base	than	the	more	mod-
erate	Abdullah	Gul	 (president	 in	2007–2014).	At	present,	Er-
dogan	has	total	dominance	in	the	party	and	the	state,	and	is	
viewed	by	a	section	of	the	public	not	as	an	elected	politician	
but	more	as	a	national	hero.	As	a	result,	support	for	him	has	
some	features	of	fanaticism.
i)	 As	 the	 stimuli	 for	 the	 implementation	 of	 political	 reforms	
weakened,	the	West	became	less	appealing	and	Erdogan’s	per-
sonal	dominance	strengthened,	Turkish	politics	over	the	years	
became	 increasingly	 ideologised.	Mustafa	Akyol,	 a	 publicist	
initially	supporting	the	AKP,	has	characterised	this	process	as	
follows:	“a	rational	and	pragmatic	paradigm	blessed	the	AKP	
with	great	success,	but	that	very	success	soon	began	to	tempt	
Erdoğan	and	his	close	circle	to	believe	they	can	simply	imag-
ine	a	new	ideological	world	and	turn	it	into	reality”14.	The	neo-
Ottoman	concepts	of	Prime	Minister	Ahmet	Davutoglu	have	
played	a	major	role	in	this	process.	In	his	vision,	Turkey	will	
inevitably	regain	its	role	as	a	powerful	state	that	will	lead	the	
Muslim	world	and	will	co-operate	with	the	West	on	pragmatic	
14	 Cf.	http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/erdogans-trouble-with-the-good-
old-akp.aspx?PageID=238&NID=79139&NewsCatID=411	
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terms.	These	concepts	have	brought	historiosophic	categories	
into	the	Turkish	political	mindset	–	objective	historical	laws,	
historical	logic,	etc.	–	at	the	expense	of	short-term	pragmatic	
political	calculation15.
j)	 The	breakout	of	the	 ‘Arab	Spring’	shifted	Ankara’s	weight	of	
attention	 to	 the	 Arab	 world,	 stirring	 up	 the	 hopes	 that	 the	
Turkish	 regional	 leadership	 promised	 by	 Davutoglu,	 which	
had	previously	been	 in	 the	 realm	of	 cherished	but	not	quite	
real	desires,	could	finally	be	realised.
k)	 Turkey’s	 domestic	 policy	 has	 always	 been	 determined	 to	
a	great	extent	by	the	government’s	relations	with	influential	
actors	who	remain	outside	political	parties.	The	struggle	with	
the	army	was	the	leitmotif	of	the	first	decade	of	the	AKP’s	rule.	
Since	around	2012,	the	confrontation	with	the	Fethullah	Gu-
len	Movement	(once	an	ally	of	the	AKP)	has	become	the	main	
point	at	 issue	 in	political	 life	 (cf.	Appendix	 1).	 It	has	become	
especially	bitter	since	the	movement	made	an	attempt	to	over-
throw	the	government	in	December	2013	(cf.	Appendix	2).
In	the	struggle	with	the	army	the	AKP	was	the	underdog	and	
the	 clash	 acted	 a	 catalyst	 to	 the	 launch	 of	 pro-European	 re-
forms.	The	desire	to	destroy	the	Gulen	Movement,	which	is	to	
a	great	extent	a	hidden	enemy,	has,	however,	provoked	the	gov-
ernment	to	regularly	violate	the	standards	of	a	democratic	state	
governed	by	the	rule	of	law.	The	measures	employed	included	
using	the	state	apparatus	for	its	own	purposes,	suppressing	the	
freedom	of	speech,	purges	in	the	state	apparatus,	etc.	
l)	 All	 these	 factors	 have	 additionally	 been	 coupled	with	 Presi-
dent	Erdogan’s	personal	features:	megalomania,	authoritarian	
15	 Cf.	 e.g.	 the	 interview	given	by	Ahmet	Davutoglu	as	part	 of	his	manifesto	
for	the	pro-governmental	newspaper	Yeni Safak	in	March	2013:	http://www.
yenisafak.com.tr/yazidizileri/yuzyillik-parantezi-kapatacagiz-494795	
P
O
IN
T 
O
F 
V
IE
W
  0
5/
20
15
20
tendencies	and	(something	he	had	previously	restrained)	re-
sentment	towards	the	Western	civilisation	linked	to	the	forced	
Westernisation	of	Turkey	in	the	20th	century	and	the	persecu-
tion	of	Islam.	
Whatever	 the	 sequence	 and	 the	 hierarchy	 of	 the	 factors	 listed	
above,	taken	together	they	have	all	resulted	in	Turkey	leaving	the	
path	of	development	towards	a	pluralistic	democracy	and	the	rule	
of	law	under	the	AKP’s	government.	Recep	Tayyip	Erdogan’s	policy	
has	been	laying	waste	to	the	previous	achievements	at	an	express	
rate,	has	contributed	to	the	increase	in	internal	tension,	brought	
Turkey	into	the	conflict	in	the	Middle	East,	and	has	built	an	image	
of	Turkey	as	an	authoritarian,	unpredictable	and	unreliable	state.	
In	effect,	 it	did	not	 take	 long	before	Turkey	 lost	 its	prestige	and	
become	isolated	in	the	international	arena16.	One	clear	example	of	
this	was	its	painful	defeat	in	the	race	for	a	non-permanent	seat	on	
the	UN	Security	Council	in	October	2014.	In	the	secret	vote,	Tur-
key	lost	to	Spain,	receiving	only	60	out	of	193	votes	(Turkey	was	
chosen	in	2008	when	it	was	backed	by	151	nations).
16	 Cf.	 e.g.	 http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/02/turkey-inter-
national-isolation-erdogan.html	
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iii. on the Road to deMocRacy
The	Justice	and	Development	Party	(AKP)	was	formed	in	2001	by	
splintering	off	from	the	ideological	formation	named	Milli	Gorus	
(National	Vision),	 from	which	President	Recep	Tayyip	Erdogan,	
former	president	Abdullah	Gul	and	deputy	prime	minister	Bulent	
Arinc	originate.
Milli	Gorus	was	an	Islamic,	conservative,	nationalist,	anti-West-
ern	and	“anti-Zionist”	formation.	All	of	its	incarnations	as	politi-
cal	parties	were	banned	on	charges	of	acting	against	the	secular	
nature	of	the	state,	and	its	short-lived	rule	(1996–1997)	was	ended	
by	the	army’s	intervention.
The	new	party	was	 formed	 in	 response	 to	disillusionment	with	
Milli	 Gorus’s	 dogmatism	 and	 the	 conviction	 that	 a	 formation	
openly	questioning	the	ideological	foundations	of	the	state	and	in	
conflict	with	the	army	had	no	future.	The	AKP	in	contrast	was	de-
signed	as	a	party	which	could	operate	within	the	existing	political	
system,	aiming	to	change	it	from	within.	It	relinquished	the	po-
litical	Islam	slogans	and	chose	far-reaching	pragmatism	instead,	
and	set	the	goal	to	enable	the	conservative-religious	identity	to	be	
expressed	through	the	liberalisation	of	the	political	system.	This	
let	it	neutralise	accusations	of	religious	radicalism,	to	attract	new	
circles	to	the	AKP	(for	example,	the	Fethullah	Gulen	Movement),	
to	expand	its	electorate,	gain	support	 from	the	West	and,	above	
all,	to	guarantee	it	immunity	from	the	army.	
In	 contrast	 to	 Milli	 Gorus,	 the	 AKP	 presented	 itself	 as	 a	 con-
servative-democratic	 grouping,	 which	 wanted	 EU	 membership	
and	styled	itself	as	a	Muslim	equivalent	of	Christian	Democrats,	
which	was	a	novelty	on	 the	Turkish	political	 scene.	The	party’s	
manifesto,	 worded	 in	 the	 liberal-conservative	 idiom,	 envis-
aged	Turkey	opening	up	to	the	globalising	world,	without,	how-
ever,	neglecting	to	offer	due	respect	to	the	traditional	values	and	
structures	as	guarantors	of	social	unity.	It	emphasised	the	need	
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to	make	 evolutionary	 changes	 and	 opposed	 social	 engineering.	
It	mentioned	guaranteeing	respect	of	human	rights,	the	freedom	
of	speech,	belief	and	religion	and	equality	of	citizens	before	the	
law	amongst	the	tasks	of	the	state.	It	appealed	for	a	government	
model	with	 limited	power	 leaving	citizens	room	for	own	 initia-
tives	and	participation	in	decision-making	processes.	It	opposed	
the	bureaucracy	usurping	power.	Last	but	not	least,	it	promised	to	
build	an	inclusive	political	nation,	united	through	geography	and	
the	common	“bittersweet	memories”17.
By	carrying	out	the	reforms	rapidly,	the	AKP	earned	a	great	de-
gree	of	confidence	from	various	circles	–	from	religious	conserv-
atives	 to	 a	 section	 of	 the	 liberal	 intelligentsia.	 This	 happened	
regardless	of	the	fact	that	the	AKP	had	acted	inconsistently	on	
many	occasions	since	taking	power.	Democratisation	and	state	
building	were	often	given	lower	priority	due	to	political	logic18,	
European	 integration	 slogans	were	 accompanied	 by	 outbursts	
of	religious	and	conservative	rhetoric	and	some	controversial	or	
even	outright	unlawful	methods	were	employed	in	the	struggle	
with	the	old	establishment	(cf.	Appendix	3).	The	transformation	
of	Islamists	into	democrats	aroused	distrust	in	many	circles	in	
Turkey	and	also	suspicions	that	this	was	merely	a	smokescreen	
and	a	 tool	 to	 take	power	and	divert	Turkey	 from	its	course	 to-
wards	the	West.	
Some	of	the	steps	which	contributed	to	the	democratisation,	mod-
ernisation	and	economic	development	of	the	country	in	the	first	
decade	 of	 the	 21st	 century	 had	 been	 taken	 before	 the	 AKP	 took	
power.	 These	 included	 Kemal	 Dervis’s	 programme	 of	 financial	
17	 Cf.	The	AKP’s	electoral	manifesto	from	2002,	Her şey Türkiye için,	p.	12.
http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/eyayin/GAZETELER/WEB/KUTUPHANEDE%20
BULUNAN%20DI J ITAL%20KAYNAKLAR/KITAPLAR/SIYASI%20
PARTI%20YAYINLARI/200304063%20AK%20PARTI%20SECIM%20BEY-
ANNAMESI%202002/200304063%20AK%20PARTI%20SECIM%20BEYAN-
NAMESI%202002%200000_0000.pdf
18	 Mainly	the	struggle	with	the	army,	Kurdish	separatism	and	electoral	rivalry.
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and	economic	reforms	(2001–2002),	and	the	political	reforms	led	
to	 EU	 candidate	 status	 being	 granted	 to	 Turkey	 in	 1999. But	 it	
was	the	continuity	of	government,	the	political	stability	(the	par-
liamentary	election	in	2011	was	the	first	non-snap	election	in	34	
years)	and	the	strong	political	will	to	pursue	the	reforms	ensured	
by	the	AKP,	that	were	decisive	for	country’s	transformation. 
The	AKP	made	a	significant	legislative	effort	to	bring	Turkey	clos-
er	to	meeting	the	political	criteria	of	EU	membership	in	the	area	
of	democracy,	human	rights	and	the	rule	of	law.	For	example,	six	
complex	‘harmonisation	packages’	were	adopted,	a	new	criminal	
code	came	into	force,	and	major	constitutional	amendments	were	
made.	Precedence	over	domestic	 legislation	was	also	granted	 to	
the	international	treaties	and	conventions	ratified	by	Turkey.	In	
effect,	accession	negotiations	between	Turkey	and	the	EU	were	of-
ficially	initiated	in	October	2005.	
The	 reforms	were	 also	 continued	 in	 subsequent	 years,	 albeit	 at	
a	 slower	 rate.	 Amendments	 were	 made	 to	 the	 foundations	 act	
(thus	 improving	 the	 situation	of	 the	 third	 sector	and	of	nation-
al	minorities)	and	the	criminal	code	(for	example,	changing	the	
wording	of	article	301,	which	penalised	 the	“offence	of	Turkish-
ness”).	A	package	of	constitutional	amendments	concerning	 the	
judiciary	and	the	army	was	adopted	in	a	referendum	on	12	Sep-
tember	 201019.	 Five	 legislative	 packages	 were	 adopted	 between	
2011	and	2014	bringing	the	Turkish	judiciary	system	and	criminal	
law	closer	to	EU	standards20	and	introducing	stricter	anti-corrup-
tion	regulations.	These	included	amendments	to	a	number	of	re-
pressive	 articles	 of	 the	 criminal	 code	and	 the	 act	 on	 combating	
terrorism	(Terörle Mücadele Kanunu).
19	 For	example,	making	it	possible	for	military	personnel	to	be	tried	by	the	ci-
vilian	courts.	Despite	the	obvious	internal	political	context,	which	was	ad-
ditionally	emphasised	by	the	date	of	the	referendum	(the	20th	anniversary	
of	the	coup	of	1980),	the	EU	saw	them	as	a	step	in	the	right	direction.
20	 Cf.	http://www.tesev.org.tr/assets/publications/file/06122013161517.pdf	
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In	 effect,	 the	 AKP	 established	 civilian	 control	 over	 the	 army,	
curbed	 the	 impunity	 of	 the	 state	 apparatus,	 and	 improved	 ac-
cess	to	the	administration	of	justice,	public	services	and	informa-
tion.	It	also	restrained	corruption	in	the	public	sector	and	made	
the	functioning	of	this	sector	more	transparent.	It	took	measures	
as	part	of	the	system	to	improve	the	protection	of	human	rights,	
the	rights	of	women21	and	children,	and	to	prevent	torture,	early	
school-leaving,	sex	discrimination	and	sexual	abuse.	It	also	made	
efforts	to	change	the	mentality	and	practices	of the	state	appara-
tus	(these	included	training	for	hundreds	of	thousands	of	police	
officers,	gendarmes,	judges,	public	prosecutors,	prison	personnel,	
welfare	workers,	etc.).
The	AKP’s	 rule	has	 resulted	 in	a	kind	of	 ‘desacralisation’	 of	 the	
state,	 an	 appreciation	 of	 the	 Turkish	 public	 (who	 had	 previ-
ously	been	viewed	by	the	elites	as	 ‘material	to	be	civilised’)	and	
a	strengthening	of	the	sense	of	personal	security	as	perceived	by	
citizens.	This	has	contributed,	for	example,	to	the	rapid	develop-
ment	 of	 the	 non-governmental	 sector,	 first	 attempts	 to	 initiate	
public	debate	on	the	taboo	issues,	i.e.	the	Armenian	Genocide	in	
1915,	 and	 rising	 confidence	 among	Turkish	 citizens	 to	 sue	 their	
own	state	at	the	European	Court	of	Human	Rights	(the	number	of	
claims	brought	against	Turkey	 increased	fourfold	between	2005	
and	2011).
After	 decades	 of	 nationalist	 indoctrination,	 the	 AKP’s	 rhetoric	
brought	 to	 the	 Turkish	 political	 discourse	 a	 vision	 which	 had	
21	 Including	the	ratification	of	the	Council	of	Europe	Convention	on	prevent-
ing	and	combating	violence	against	women	and	domestic	violence,	the	es-
tablishment	of	a	parliamentary	commission	for	the	equal	status	of	women	
and	men,	and	introducing	a	life	sentence	for	so-called	‘honour	killings’,	the	
recommendation	to	Diyanet	(Office	for	Religion)	not	to	admit	religious	wed-
dings	 to	couples	whose	marriage	 is	not	 registered	at	a	 secular	 institution	
(to	 act	 against	marriages	with	minors	 and	 polygamy),	 fostering	women’s	
activity	on	the	labour	market	and	offering	equal	opportunities	to	them	in	
professional	life,	and	actions	aimed	at	a	full	school	enrolment of	girls	at	el-
ementary	and	secondary	school	levels.	
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previously	been	 formulated	only	by	 liberal	 intelligentsia	 circles	
–	the	vision	of	a	democratic	pluralist	state	where	each	individu-
al’s	rights	and	cultural	and	religious	identity	are	respected,	and	
where	the	state	is	for	citizens	and	not	the	other	way	around.	The	
AKP	as	the	governing	party	has	made	a	number	of	unprecedented	
gestures	with	 regard	 to	 ethnic	 and	 religious	minorities:	Greeks	
and	Armenians,	Alevis,	Assyrians	and	Roma	people,	and	above	all	
with	regard	to	Kurds	(who	form	at	least	15%	of	the	country’s	popu-
lation).	
The	 policy	 of	 negating	 and	 repressing	 Kurdish	 identity	 which	
was	pursued	from	the	onset	of	the	Republic	provoked	an	outburst	
of	the	armed	separatism	in	the	east	of	the	country	in	the	1980s.	
The	effects	of	the	civil	war	included	a	permanent	militarisation	
of	the	south-eastern	part	of	the	country,	regular	violations	of	hu-
man	rights	and	over	30,000	casualties22.	Under	the	AKP’s	rule,	the	
first	attempt	 in	 the	history	of	 the	Republic	of	Turkey	was	made	
to	launch	a	political	peace	process	aimed	at	causing	the	Kurdish	
guerrilla	 forces	 (PKK)	 to	 lay	 down	 their	 arms	 in	 exchange	 for	
greater	autonomy	offered	to	regions	inhabited	by	Kurds	(as	part	
of	the	decentralisation	of	the	country	as	a	whole).	The	moves	made	
as	part	of	 the	concessions	offered	 to	 the	Kurdish	population	 in-
cluded	the	creation	of	a	national	TV	channel	which	broadcast	pro-
22	 According	 to	 official	 data,	 in	 1989–1999	 (when	 the	 PKK’s	 leader	Abdullah	
Ocalan	was	arrested),	5,564	public	sector	workers	and	4,727	civilians	were	
killed	‘on	the	Turkish	side’	in	the	fights	with	the	PKK.	The	official	statistics	
fail	 to	 include	not	only	the	victims	on	the	PKK’s	side,	who	were	predomi-
nantly	Turkish	citizens,	but	also	the	victims	among	the	Kurdish	population	
who	faced	repressions	due	to	their	real	or	alleged	connections	with	the	PKK.	
During	the	state	of	emergency	which	continued	in	south-eastern	Turkey	for	
more	 than	20	years	 (martial	 law	 in	 1978–1987	and	 the	 state	of	emergency	
in	1987–2002),	paramilitary	militias	(so-called	‘village	guards’),	radical	Is-
lamic	groupings	 (Hezbollah)	and	mafia	structures	were	among	 the	 forces	
used	to	combat	the	Kurdish	guerrillas	and	to	force	the	civilian	population	to	
be	loyal.	Torture	was	used	on	a	massive	scale	at	penal	institutions	in	south-
eastern	Turkey.	520	people	went	missing	between	1991	and	1999.	
Cf.	http://gundem.milliyet.com.tr/26-yilin-kanli-bilancosu/guncel/gundemde-
tay/24.06.2010/1254711/default.htm;	http://bianet.org/bianet/insan-haklari/52998-
turkiyede-gozaltinda-kayiplar;	http://www.ihddiyarbakir.org/map.aspx	
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grammes	 in	Kurdish,	permission	 to	 establish	Kurdish	 language	
and	culture	departments	at	three	universities	and	to	use	Kurdish	
as	the	language	of	instruction	at	private	schools,	as	well	as	to	use	
Kurdish	in	political	campaigning	and	also	in	courts	and	prisons.	
As	with	other	key	issues,	the	AKP’s	policy	with	regard	to	Kurds	
has	been	inconsistent,	and	has	included	periodical	returns	to	na-
tionalist	rhetoric	and	intensified	repression.	Its	ultimate	effect	is	
less	and	less	certain,	especially	given	the	increasingly	authoritar-
ian	tendencies	in	Ankara’s	policy	and	the	dynamics	of	changes	in	
the	Middle	East.	At	the	same	time,	the	AKP	was	the	first	politi-
cal	force	in	the	history	of	the	Republic	of	Turkey	to	have	a	suffi-
cient	level	of	power,	public	support	and	will	to	start	treating	the	
Kurdish	issue	in	political	and	not	strictly	military	terms.	This	has	
changed	the	living	conditions	of	millions	of	Turkish	citizens.	
Despite	 the	 AKP’s	 achievements	 even	 after	 a	 decade	 of	 reforms	
the	democratisation	of	Turkey	remained	far	from	completion.	The	
new	constitution	has	not	been	adopted	(the	one	currently	in	force	
is	a	leftover	of	the	coup	in	1980),	the	articles	of	the	criminal	code	
which	constrain	the	freedom	of	speech	and	the	repressive	act	on	
combating	terrorism	have	not	been	repealed,	there	is	still	no	guar-
antee	 that	 state	 officials	may	 face	 criminal	 liability	 for	 abuse	 of	
power,	 and	 the	 law	 enforcement	 agencies	 and	 central	 regulators	
can	still	be	used	by	politicians	for	their	own	ends.	Despite	the	pro-
found	changes,	Turkey	(both	as	a	state	and	as	a	nation)	remained	
under	 the	 influence	 of	 a	 culture	 permeated	 with	 authority,	 hi-
erarchy,	 violence,	 impunity,	 the	 conservative-patriarchal	 spirit,	
corruption	 and	 nepotism.	 Therefore,	when	 the	AKP’s	 policy	 line	
changed	and	the	country	started	drifting	towards	authoritarian-
ism,	this	process	was	not	opposed,	and	in	many	ways	moved	along	
old	tracks.
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iV. the tuRKish ciVilisational leap
The	giant	economic	and	civilisational	 leap	 seen	 in	Turkey	 since	
2002	has	been	the	source	of	the	high	public	approval	ratings	for	
the	AKP	(the	number	of	votes	cast	for	this	party	increased	from	10	
million	in	2002	to	21	million	in	2014).	
Turkey	is	still	a	country	of	social	contrasts	on	a	scale	unseen	in	
the	EU.	Four	Turkish	universities	are	classified	among	the	world’s	
200	best	higher	education	facilities.	At	the	same	time,	the	number	
of	 illiterate	adult	citizens	of	Turkey	exceeds	3	million23.	The	dif-
ference	in	the	average	age	of	population	in	the	east	and	the	west	
of	the	country	is	18	years24.	Marriages	with	minors25,	polygamy26	
and	so-called	honour	killings	–	all	phenomena	traditionally	asso-
ciated	with	the	less	developed	eastern	part	of	the	country	–	are	in	
decline,	but	still	remain	a	reality.	
The	scale	of	the	changes	which	have	taken	place	in	Turkey	since	
2002	 was	 aptly	 reflected	 in	 the	 AKP’s	 electoral	 slogan	 in	 2011	
“Hayaldi gerçek oldu”	 (“What	was	 a	 dream	has	 become	 reality”).	
Although	 Turkey’s	 population	 has	 grown	 by	 almost	 7	million27,	
prosperity	has	 increased	and	has	become	more	widespread,	 the	
availability	and	quality	of	healthcare	has	improved	rapidly,	edu-
cation	has	become	more	accessible	to	the	general	public,	transport	
23	 Cf.	http://www.konda.com.tr/tr/verican.php,	computer	graphics	 titled	2,6 
milyon yetişkin kadin okuryazar değil
24	 The	average	age	of	a	resident	of	Sirnak	province	bordering	on	Iraq	is	slightly	
above	18	years,	and	 in	Canakkale	province	 in	western	Turkey	 is	37	years.	
Cf.	http://www.radikal.com.tr/turkiye/en_genc_sirnak_en_yasli_canak-
kale-1077629	
25	 For	example,	the	former	president	Abdullah	Gul	married	his	wife,	Hayrun-
nisa	in	1980	three	days	after	she	had	officially	turned	15	(however,	it	is	pos-
sible	that	her	family	did	not	register	her	birth	immediately).
26	 Cf.	http://www.haber7.com/neler-oluyor-hayatta/haber/994254-iste-tur-
kiyede-kumanin-en-cok-oldugu-koy
27	 From	69.87	million	in	2002	to	76.67	million	in	2013.	Data	from	the	Turkish	
Statistical	Office	(TÜİK).
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infrastructure	has	been	developed,	and	IT	has	been	more	easily	
accessible	under	the	AKP’s	rule.
Turkey’s	GDP	per capita	(PPP)	rose	from	US$10,000	in	2002	to	al-
most	US$19,000	 in	 2013	 (data	 from	 the	 IMF).	 The	 percentage	 of	
households	 qualified	 as	 the	middle	 class	 increased	 from	 18%	 in	
1993	 to	 41%	 in	 201028.	The	percentage	of	people	 living	below	 the	
poverty	line	in	the	first	decade	of	the	21th	century	fell	from	around	
16%	 to	 5%	 of	 the	 population29.	 Goods	 and	 services	 have	 become	
more	easily	accessible;	for	example,	the	annual	number	of	domes-
tic	flight	passengers	rose	from	around	9	million	in	2002	to	76	mil-
lion	in	201330.
Budget	expenditure	on	welfare	and	healthcare	has	been	growing.	
In	2002,	the	value	of	benefits	was	equivalent	to	0.5%	of	GDP,	and	in	
2013	this	rate	rose	to	1.5%	of	GDP31.	8	million	people	are	subsidised	
by	the	state	to	pay	for	their	health	insurance.	The	mortality	rate	
of	children	under	5	fell	from	32	per	1,000	children	in	2002	to	14	
in	2013.	The	statistical	life	expectancy	has	risen	5	years	since	the	
beginning	of	the	20th	century,	and	is	now	75.	
There	has	been	a	rapid	development	in	infrastructure:	airports,	
motorways,	 high-speed	 railways	 and	 hospitals.	 In	 Istanbul,	
a	 railway	 tunnel	 running	 under	 the	 Bosphorus	 has	 been	 built,	
and	a	third	bridge	across	the	strait	and	the	third	airport	are	un-
der	 construction.	 The	 urbanisation	 of	 the	 country	 has	 gained	
28	 The	 middle	 class	 as	 defined	 according	 to	 the	 World	 Bank’s	 criteria,	 i.e.	
a	minimum	of	US$10	 (PPP)	daily	per	person.	Data	 from	 the	World	Bank’s	
report	Turkey’s Transitions. Integration. Inclusion. Institutions,	http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2014/1
2/04/000470435_20141204124514/Rendered/PDF/905090v20ESW0w0ip0fin
al0print0nov29.pdf	
29	 Data	as	in	op. cit.,	p.	44.
30	 Data	as	in:	http://www.dhmi.gov.tr/istatistik.aspx
31	 Data	as	in:	http://www.turkeyanalyst.org/publications/turkey-analyst-articles/
item/106-welfare-policies-are-the-key-to-the-akp%E2%80%99s-electoral-suc-
cesses.html
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momentum.	The	urban	population	has	increased	from	43	million	
to	55	million,	i.e.	from	66%	to	73%	of	the	total	population	(World	
Bank’s	 data).	 Rapid	 development	 has	 been	 seen	 not	 only	 in	 the	
three	 big	metropolises,	 Istanbul,	Ankara	 and	 Izmir,	 but	 also	 in	
the	cities	in	central	and	eastern	Turkey,	the	so-called	Anatolian	
Tigers,	including:	Denizli,	Kayseri,	Konya,	Gaziantep	and	Kahra-
manmaras.
Over	 50	 state	 universities	 and	 over	 40	 private	 universities	were	
established	between	2006	and	201432.	The	number	of	Internet	us-
ers	 increased	from	11	per	 100	 in	2002	to	46	per	 100	 in	2013.	Even	
though	the	knowledge	of	 foreign	 languages	 is	still	not	something	
the	Turkish	public	can	be	especially	proud	about,	Turkey	is	among	
the	 fastest	 improvers	 in	 this	 regard	 and	 international	 rankings	
currently	rate	Turkey	more	or	less	on	the	same	level	as	France	and	
Italy33.	Thus	the	period	of	the	AKP’s	rule	has	brought	about	a	rapid	
modernisation	in	financial	and	social	terms.	The	living	standards	
of	most	citizens	have	improved,	and	promotion	to	the	middle	class	
and	consumer	goods	have	become	much	more	accessible.	The	AKP’s	
rule	has	also	offered	the	Turkish	public	significantly	higher	stand-
ards	as	regards	infrastructure	and	the	quality	of	public	services.	
The	driving	force	behind	the	Turkish	‘economic	miracle’	was	the	
unprecedented	 construction	 and	 consumption	 boom	 (consump-
tion	accounts	for	70%	of	Turkey’s	GDP),	financed	largely	by	loans.	
This	was	possible	because	 the	monetary	and	credit	policies	had	
been	 eased	 worldwide	 on	 a	 scale	 unseen	 before.	 However,	 one	
consequence	of	this	is	the	rapid	increase	in	company	and	house-
hold	debt.	Turkey	has	a	population	of	74	million,	and	the	number	
of	credit	cards	issued	there	is	57	million34	and	the	aggregate	debt	
32	 Cf.	http://tr.wikipedia.org/wiki/T%C3%BCrkiye%27deki_%C3%BCniversite
ler_listesi
33	 Cf.	http://www.ef.com/__/~/media/efcom/epi/2014/full-reports/ef-epi-
2013-report-master.pdf
34	 Cf.	http://www.bkm.com.tr/istatistik/pos_atm_kart_sayisi.asp
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on	these	cards	is	worth	around	US$45	billion,	approximately	30%	
of	which	are	outstanding	debts.	The	indebtedness	of	households	
as	compared	to	their	incomes	rose	from	around	5%	in	2002	to	50%	
in	2012.	In	effect,	the	scale	of	indebtedness	of	individuals	and	com-
panies	is	becoming	an	increasing	problem	for	Turkey,	and	many	
economists	warn	that	 the	Turkish	prosperity	seen	at	 the	begin-
ning	of	the	21st	century	may	turn	into	a	painful	slump35.	
35	 Cf.	e.g.	http://www.forbes.com/sites/jessecolombo/2014/03/05/why-the-
worst-is-still-ahead-for-turkeys-bubble-economy/
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V. on the Road to autocRacy
A	run	of	electoral	successes	and	victories	in	confrontations	with	
the	 establishment36	 gradually	 strengthened	 the	AKP,	weakened	
its	determination	to	carry	out	reforms	and	encouraged	it	to	em-
ploy	conservative	and	religious	rhetoric.	2013	marked	a	 turning	
point.	The	street	demonstrations	initiated	by	the	protests	against	
the	liquidation	of	Gezi	Park	in	Istanbul37	(which	Prime	Minister	
Erdogan	saw	as	an	attempt	to	overthrow	the	government)	and	the	
corruption	scandal	in	December	(cf.	Appendix	2)	served	as	a	cat-
alyst	 for	Erdogan’s	building	of	his	personal	power,	 for	 the	rapid	
deterioration	of	legal	and	democratic	standards	and	the	margin-
alisation	of	moderate	politicians	in	the	AKP.
Erdogan	 became	 president	 after	 his	 victory	 in	 the	 election	 in	
August	2014.	Even	though	in	the	Turkish	political	system	this	is	
a	 non-partisan	 and	 to	 a	 great	 extent	 a	 ceremonial	 position,	 Er-
dogan	 has	 remained	 the	 unquestioned	 party	 and	 government	
leader.	He	is	the	one	who	makes	the	key	political	and	staffing	de-
cisions,	he	often	chairs	government	meetings	and	holds	top-level	
international	 talks.	At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	prestige	of	 this	office	
allows	him	avoid	political	responsibility	and	criticism.	The	monu-
mental	presidential	palace	(Ak Saray),	which	cost	US$615	million	
and	has	1,150	rooms,	is	an	external	symbol	of	Erdogan’s	position	
in	Turkey.
President	Erdogan’s	dominance,	which	openly	violates	the	Turk-
ish	constitutional	order,	is	possible	because	of	the	high	level	of	
36	 The	crisis	 linked	to	the	election	of	Abdullah	Gul	as	president	 in	2007,	 the	
unsuccessful	attempt	at	banning	the	AKP	in	2008,	the	constitutional	refer-
endum	in	2010,	and	the	dismissals	of	the	head	of	the	general	staff	and	three	
types	of	armed	forces	in	2011.
37	 The	public	protests	which	began	on	28	May	2013,	 initially	only	on	a	small	
scale	in	Istanbul	in	defence	of	Gezi	Park	which	was	about	to	be	liquidated	
later	 turned	 into	mass	demonstrations	 in	all	major	urban	centres	against	
the	brutality	of	the	police	and	the	government’s	arrogance.	Eleven	people	
were	killed	in	the	protests.
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public	support,	the	nomination	for	prime	minister	of	Ahmet	Da-
vutoglu,	who	is	loyal	to	Erdogan,	and	the	scale	of	the	president’s	
influence	 in	 the	 government	 party,	 the	 state	 apparatus,	 busi-
ness,	 and	 the	media.	Erdogan	wants	 to	 strengthen	and	 legally	
sanction	his	monocracy	 through	 the	 introduction	of	 the	presi-
dential	political	system	in	Turkey	following	the	parliamentary	
election	in	2015.	However,	the	AKP	may	be	unable	to	gain	a	con-
stitutional	majority.	
Erdogan’s	autocratic	system	is	based	on	personal	loyalty.	He	has	
been	removing	the	AKP’s	experienced	and	moderate	politicians	
from	 the	 decision-making	 process,	 replacing	 them	 with	 new	
people	who	 are	 completely	 dependent	 upon	 him.	 This	 process	
will	 be	 crowned	with	 the	 parliamentary	 election	 in	 June	 this	
year.	Given	the	internal	party	regulations	which	were	adopted	
in	 the	early	days	of	 the	AKP	and	are	at	 this	moment	very	con-
venient	 to	 Erdogan38,	 over	 70	 of	 the	 AKP’s	 most	 experienced	
politicians	 will	 be	 eliminated	 from	 politics,	 including	 the	 in-
cumbent	 parliamentary	 speaker,	 two	 deputy	 prime	ministers	
and	a	few	members	of	the	cabinet.	The	loyalty	priority	is	causing	
an	expansion	of	personal	clientelist	networks	from	the	top	gov-
ernment	levels	to	the	local	level,	and	an	increase	in	corruption	
(Transparency	International	moved	Turkey	five	positions	lower	
in	2014	than	in	2013)39.	
The	civilian	secret	service	(Milli Istihbarat Teşkilati,	MIT),	which	
Erdogan	 dubbed	 “the	 most	 important	 state	 institution”40	 is	 an	
important	element	of	Erdogan’s	government	system.	The	head	of	
MIT,	Hakan	Fidan,	 from	the	moment	of	his	nomination	 in	2010	
was	 reputed	 to	be	Erdogan’s	 closest	aide	 (Erdogan	branded	him	
as	his	 “mystery	box”)	or	even	 ‘person	number	 two	 in	 the	 state’,	
38	 A	cap	of	three	consecutive	terms	for:	membership	in	parliament	and	hold-
ing	political	party	and	government	positions.	
39	 Cf.	e.g.	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=s5sZp_tEVTc	
40	 Cf.	http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/28355030.asp	
P
O
IN
T 
O
F 
V
IE
W
  0
5/
20
15
33
who	has	been	put	in	charge	of	the	most	critical	issues,	such	as	the	
Kurdish	peace	process	and	the	support	for	the	Syrian	armed	op-
position41.	A	crisis	in	relations	between	the	head	of	MIT	and	the	
president	 was	 observed	 at	 the	 beginning	 of	 2015,	 when	 Hakan	
Fidan	handed	in	his	resignation	and	stated	he	would	take	part	in	
the	parliamentary	election	as	an	AKP	candidate42.	Erdogan	criti-
cised	Fidan’s	decision	on	several	occasions,	and	then	forced	him	
to	withdraw	from	participation	in	the	election	and	return	to	his	
previous	position.	These	incidents	will	certainly	have	an	impact	
on	the	personal	relations	between	the	president	and	Fidan.	How-
ever,	the	role	of	the	secret	services	will	not	be	reduced.	One	proof	
of	this	is	the	fact	that	a	separate	building	allocated	to	MIT	will	be	
built	as	part	of	the	presidential	complex.	
The	methods	employed	by	Erdogan	to	consolidate	public	support	
and	his	own	political	camp	include	the	use	of	the	narrative	‘with	
or	against	us’,	stigmatising	his	critics	and	pointing	to	new	internal	
and	external	enemies	who	are	allegedly	sabotaging	Turkey’s	suc-
cesses.	The	logic	of	closing	ranks	and	protecting	group	interests	at	
any	price	has	additionally	been	reinforced	through	the	confron-
tation	with	the	Gulen	Movement	ongoing	since	December	201343.	
The	polarising	rhetoric	finds	fertile	ground	amongst	the	Turkish	
public,	who	indulge	in	conspiracy	theories.	This	results	in	rising	
social	tension	and	the	radicalisation	of	political	views.	One	effect	
of	the	escalating	atmosphere	of	internal	conflict	is	the	increasing	
presence	of	political	violence.	Examples	of	such	incidents	include	
41	 http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240527023036433045791073735
85228330	
42	 He	was	probably	persuaded	to	do	this	by	Prime	Minister	Ahmet	Davutoglu,	
who	wanted	to	use	this	as	a	way	of	ensuring	his	government	a	stronger	posi-
tion	in	dealings	with	the	president	after	the	election.	
43	 One	example	of	 this	was	 the	pardoning	 (under	government	pressure	and	
despite	 hard	 evidence)	 of	 four	 former	 ministers	 involved	 in	 corruption	
scandals	which	were	revealed	as	a	consequence	of	the	wave	of	arrests	in	De-
cember	 2013.	 Cf.	 http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/parliament-acquits-
four-ex-ministers-on-corruption-but-vote-stirs-ruling-akp.aspx?PageID=2
38&NID=77188&NewsCatID=338	
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recurring	 fights	 at	 university	 campuses	 between	 supporters	 of	
radical	political	groupings,	mainly	Kurds	and	Turkish	national-
ists,	some	of	which	resulted	in	deaths44,	or	the	radical	 left’s	ter-
rorist	attack	on	the	prosecutor’s	office	in	Istanbul	in	March	201545.	
This	 could	 potentially	 pose	 the	 risk	 of	 a	 return	 of	 the	 political	
violence	on	the	streets	which	was	characteristic	of	Turkey	in	the	
1960s	and	1970s.	
Restricting	the	freedom	of	speech	and	the	use	of	the	state	appara-
tus	to	spy	on	and	fight	his	political	opponents	are	inherent	in	the	
process	of	building	Recep	Tayyip	Erdogan’s	personal	power.	Each	
case	of	criticism	(expressed	in	the	media,	on	the	Internet,	at	a	uni-
versity,	etc.),	any	sign	of	protest	or	any	other	form	of	opposition	
activity	can	be	termed	slander	or	another	kind	of	illicit	behaviour,	
and	meet	with	a	reaction	from	the	prosecution	authorities	or,	for	
example,	be	punished	by	the	loss	of	a	job.	For	instance,	the	doctors	
who	 offered	medical	 aid	 in	 a	mosque	 to	 injured	 demonstrators	
during	the	protests	in	summer	2013	faced	charges	of	contaminat-
ing	a	sacred	place	and	aiding	criminals.	Erdogan	and	other	mem-
bers	of	the	government	elite	(for	example,	the	mayor	of	Ankara,	
Melih	Gokcek)	 sue	 their	 critics	 for	 libel	 on	a	 regular	basis,	 and	
usually	win	in	court46.
44	 Cf.	e.g.	http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/02/new-turkey-
nationalists.html	and	http://t24.com.tr/haber/universitede-kavga-hazirli-
gi-emanetleri-getirin-orgutculer-halay-cekeceklermis,289417	
45	 Cf.	 http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/17/opinion/mustafa-akyol-paranoia-
and-polarization-in-turkey.html?smid=tw-share&_r=0
46	 At	 the	 end	 of	 February	 2015,	 the	 number	 of	 individuals	 who	 measures	
were	taken	against	in	connection	with	the	alleged	slander	of	the	president	
reached	67	(summons	to	give	statements,	investigation,	arrest,	indictment,	
fine	 imposed,	etc.).	The	 legal	grounds	for	 these	measures	are	provided	by	
article	 299	 of	 the	 Turkish	 criminal	 code,	which	 defines	 the	 crime	 of	 “of-
fence	of	Turkishness,	the	Republic,	state	authorities	or	institutions.”	These	
measures	have	been	taken	for	example	 in	response	to	putting	up	posters,	
chanting	 political	 slogans,	 posting	 on	 social	 networking	 services	 or	 be-
ing	 the	 author	 of	 press	 or	 TV	 publications.	 Cf.	 http://www.diken.com.tr/
her-gun-yeni-bir-sorusturma-erdogana-hakaretle-suclananlarin-say-
isi-67yi-buldu/;	https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1-ubIq-BchOd-
F4LqQW3LEDGg16MeormYjO58DnO9eJwE/edit?pli=1#gid=256169234	
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Access	to	around	70,000	Internet	URL	addresses	is	permanently	
restricted	in	Turkey	following	court	verdicts	(over	16,000	address-
es	were	restricted	in	2014	alone)47.	Restrictions	on	access	to	social	
networking	services,	such	as	Facebook,	Twitter,	YouTube,	etc.,	are	
imposed	 frequently.	 The	 Turkish	 government	 is	 also	 the	 global	
leader	on	the	number	of	requests	to	remove	inconvenient	content	
sent	to	social	networking	services48.	The	government	wants	to	be	
able	to	restrict	access	to	any	website	using	administrative	proce-
dures	and	to	force	Internet	providers	to	archive	data	concerning	
users’	activity	and	to	reveal	these	data	to	state	authorities49.	
Although	the	private	media	market	is	very	well	developed	in	Tur-
key	(hundreds	of	newspapers,	dozens	of	TV	channels,	including	
more	 than	 ten	news	 channels),	 Freedom	House	 Foundation	has	
classified	 this	 country	 as	 ‘not	 free’	 in	 terms	 of	 freedom	 of	 the	
press.	 The	 greater	 part	 of	 large	media	 outlets	 form	 elements	 of	
multi-sectoral	business	conglomerates	which	are	extremely	sus-
ceptible	to	political	pressure	due	to	access	to	lucrative	state	orders	
they	 are	 offered.	 The	 newspapers	with	 a	 clear	 pro-government	
bias	account	for	around	40%	of	the	press50,	and	a	significant	sec-
tion	of	the	other	media	outlets	apply	self-censorship	at	the	edito-
rial	staff	 level	and	dismiss	 journalists	who	criticise	 the	govern-
ment.	In	effect,	fear	and	self-censorship	is	becoming	widespread	
among	journalists	themselves51.	
47	 Cf.	http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/Default.aspx?pageID=238&nID=7
9262&NewsCatID=339	 and	 http://www.diken.com.tr/bir-yilda-tam-3-bin-
94-mahkeme-karariyla-16-bin-600-adres-hakkinda-islem-yapildi/	
48	 Between	July	and	December	2014,	60%	of	requests	of	this	kind	sent	to	Twit-
ter	 originated	 from	 Turkey.	 Cf.	 http://www.statista.com/chart/3217/twit-
ter-content-removal-requests/
49	 The	 acts	 regulating	 this	 issue	were	 repealed	by	 the	Constitutional	 court.	
Another	attempt	may	be	expected	in	February	2015,	when	the	president	of	
the	court	changes.	
50	 Cf.	http://econoscale.com/2014/02/15/erdogans-rise-to-power-through-
the-	media/	
51	 Cf.	the	comprehensive	report	on	the	Turkish	media	written	by	the	experi-
enced	 journalist	Yavuz	Baydar:	 http://shorensteincenter.org/wp-content/
uploads/2015/02/Turkish-Journalism-Yavuz-Baydar.pdf	
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Almost	 all	 news	 channels	 broadcast	 each	 public	 speech	 of	 the	
president	in extenso	(they	are	sometimes	broadcast	on	more	than	
ten	TV	channels	simultaneously).	The	scale	of	government	pres-
sure	 on	 the	 media	 was	 evident	 for	 example	 at	 the	 time	 of	 the	
protests	 in	 2013,	 when	 foreign	 TV	 channels	 gave	 incomparably	
more	publicity	and	in	a	shorter	time	than	the	Turkish	ones.	The	
recordings	of	Recep	Tayyip	Erdogan’s	telephone	calls	which	were	
leaked	to	the	Internet	revealed	that	he	had	personally	instructed	
media	editors	what	kind	of	opinions	they	should	publish	to	meet	
the	government’s	expectations.	The	fact	that	on	numerous	occa-
sions	the	outlets	sympathetic	with	the	AKP	have	published	almost	
identically	sounding	pro-government	headlines	or	articles	gives	
grounds	for	the	suspicion	that	the	government	provides	instruc-
tions	for	the	media	in	a	regular	and	organised	manner52.	Further-
more,	between	2010	and	2014,	the	Turkish	courts	imposed	around	
150	bans	on	circulating	information	concerning	important	issues	
(state	security	being	the	usual	reason	given)53.	In	the	global	press	
freedom	ranking	published	by	Reporters	Without	Borders,	Tur-
key	fell	from	the	98th	position	(in	2005)	to	154th	(in	2014)54.	
Since	 the	mass	 protests	 in	 summer	 2013	 (over	 8,000	 people	 in-
jured,	 7,700	 suffered	 respiratory	problems	connected	 to	 the	use	
of	pepper	spray	and	11	died),	the	government	has	responded	with	
52	 On	5	March	2015,	columns	with	the	same	title	were	published	by	thirteen	
authors	in	five	pro-governmental	daily	newspapers.	
Cf.	http://www.radikal.com.tr/turkiye/13_kose_yazarindan_ayni_bas-
lik_diliniz_kaba_vicdaniniz_tas-1306617	 and	 http://www.diken.com.tr/
kabatas-korosuna-yanit-sosyal-medyadan-diliniz-yalan-vicdaniniz-kara/	
53	 These	include	the	eavesdropping	devices	found	at	the	prime	minister’s	of-
fice,	the	bombardment	of	the	civilian	population	by	the	Turkish	air	forces	in	
Uludere	in	December	2011,	the	terrorist	attacks	in	Reyhanli	in	2013,	the	an-
ti-corruption	operation	in	December	2013,	the	fact	that	the	military	police	
stopped	a	convoy	of	trucks	heading	to	Syria	sent	by	the	Turkish	intelligence	
agency	in	January	2014,	and	the	leaks	from	the	secret	meeting	at	the	Turkish	
Ministry	of	Foreign	Affairs	concerning	Syria	in	March	2014.	
54	 This	ranking	is	not	absolutely	dependable	(for	example,	there	is	some	doubt	
as	to	whether	the	press	really	has	more	freedom	in	Russia	and	Tajikistan	than	
in	Turkey),	however	it	correctly	illustrates	the	scale	of	regress	seen	in	Turkey.	
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violence	to	any	attempts	to	hold	street	protests.	More	than	1,500	
people	were	beaten	or	 injured	and	over	 11,000	were	arrested	 in	
2014	as	a	consequence	of	police	suppression	of	protests	and	dem-
onstrations55.	 The	 police	 used	 pepper	 spray	 on	 224	 occasions	 to	
suppress	demonstrations.	Eight	people	were	killed	and	over	400	
injured	due	to	pepper	spray	or	by	being	hit	with	a	tear	gas	canis-
ter56.	The	governmental	public	security	package	of	laws	officially	
named	as	‘The	Package	for	the	Protection	of	Freedom’	adopted	in	
March	2015	has	given	the	police	more	extensive	powers	to	use	fire-
arms,	detain	and	search	people	and	property,	and	tap	telephones	
(for	up	to	48	hours	without	a	court	decision)57.	
One	effect	of	 the	 increasingly	repressive	and	polarising	govern-
ment	style	in	Turkey	is	the	re-emergence	of	the	fear	to	openly	ex-
press	one’s	views,	of	self-censorship	and	discouragement	from	be-
ing	engaged	in	socio-political	activity.	In	civilisational	terms,	this	
moves	Turkey	away	from	the	Western	world	and	has	a	toxic	effect	
on	the	atmosphere	in	public	 life.	However,	a	person	with	 ‘unor-
thodox	views’	is	still	not	at	risk	of	being	kidnapped	or	treacher-
ously	 murdered	 by	 chronically	 ‘unidentified	 perpetrators’,	 and	
opposition	parties	and	non-governmental	organisations	have	not	
been	 banned	 as	 yet,	 which	 makes	 present-day	 Turkey	 distinct	
from	the	Kemalist	state.	
55	 These	data	have	been	 taken	 from	the	annual	 report	of	 the	Human	Rights	
Association	(Insan	Haklari	Dernegi,	IHD).	IHD,	which	was	founded	in	1986,	
is	an	organisation	historically	linked	to	the	Kurdish	issue	in	Turkey.	It	is	es-
pecially	interested	in	monitoring	cases	of	human	rights	violation	in	south-
eastern	Turkey.	 In	effect,	a	 significant	part	of	 the	 incidents	 registered	by	
this	association	and	taken	into	account	in	the	report	have	been	placed	in	the	
context	of	the	Turkish	state’s	struggle	with	the	Kurdish	underground	(PKK)	
ongoing	since	the	1980s,	and	due	to	this	it	is	more	difficult	to	evaluated	them	
only	in	terms	of	whether	they	meet	the	legal	and	democratic	standards	of	
the	Turkish	state	authorities.	Nevertheless,	IHD’s	detailed	reports	are	a	reli-
able	source	of	knowledge	on	the	status	of	human	rights	in	Turkey.	Cf.	http://
ihd.org.tr/images/2015/son-hd-2014-raporu.pdf	,	pages	13-14	and	119-162.
56	 Cf.	 http://www.diken.com.tr/emniyetin-biber-gazi-masallari-insan-sagli-
gina-zararsiz-2014te-hayatini-kaybeden-kimse-yok/
57	 Cf.	http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/explained-turkeys-controversial-
security-bill.aspx?pageID=238	
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Vi. tuRKey’s ciVilisational identity  
undeR aKp Rule 
The	 identity	 of	 the	 Republic	 of	 Turkey,	 pursuant	 to	 the	 state’s	
manifesto,	was	built	on	opposition	towards	the	Ottoman	Empire,	
negating	the	civilisational	links	with	the	Middle	East	and	reject-
ing	the	history	before	1919.	An	antagonistic	separation	of	the	state	
and	 religion,	 reminiscent	 of	 the	 French	 laïcité,	was	 introduced.	
Islam	became	supervised	by	the	state	(a	Presidency	of	Religious	
Affairs,	Diyanet, was	established	 in	1924)	and	pushed	to	the	pri-
vate	sphere.	
The	 Turkish	 state’s	 policy	 on	 religion	 underwent	 fluctuations	
throughout	the	20th	century;	for	instance,	it	was	less	strict	in	the	
periods	when	the	army	viewed	an	upsurge	in	leftist	sentiments	as	
the	main	threat	to	the	state.	For	similar	reasons,	the	state	estab-
lishment	would	admit	–	albeit	selectively	and	sporadically	–	some	
references	to	the	Ottoman	past	(for	example,	in	1986,	the	Bospho-
rus	 Bridge	 was	 named	 after	 Sultan	Mehmed	 II	 the	 Conqueror,	
and	a	banknote	with	his	portrait	was	 issued58).	However,	when	
the	Cold	War	was	over	and	 the	Communist	 threat	ceased	 to	ex-
ist,	the	‘religious	reactionaries’	(irtica)	were	defined	by	the	army	
as	the	main	threat	to	the	state’s	ideological	foundations;	and	this	
entailed	intensified	persecutions	of	religious	Muslims.	
In	the	1990s,	Muslim	women	wearing	the	veil	were	denied	access	
to	universities,	legal	measures	were	taken	against	Muslim	frater-
nities,	and	participation	in	religious	practices	could	be	a	sufficient	
reason	to	be	dismissed	from	a	job	in	the	state	administration.	A	fe-
male	MP	who	came	to	the	parliament’s	opening	session	wearing	
a	headscarf	was	deprived	of	her	parliamentary	seat	and	Turkish	
citizenship.	Conservative-religious	parties	were	banned.	
58	 A	1,000	lira	banknote	which	was	in	circulation	in	1986–1992.	This	banknote	
was	the	only	one	in	the	history	of	the	Republic	of	Turkey	to	display	an	image	
of	a	ruler	from	the	Ottoman	dynasty.	
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When	the	AKP	came	to	power,	the	process	of	revising	the	state’s	
approach	towards	history	and	religion	began.	As	the	AKP	gained	
in	strength,	 it	more	and	more	openly	challenged	the	ideological	
principles	of	Kemalism	and	took	on	the	task	of	returning	dignity	
to	the	religious	majority	among	the	Turkish	public,	of	reconstruct-
ing	the	civilisational	bonds	with	the	Middle	East	and	restoring,	
what	it	saw	as	Turkey’s	rightful	position	as	an	empire.	
One	symbolic	change	in	the	state’s	attitude	towards	religion	was	
the	gradual	lifting	of	the	restrictions	on	wearing	headscarves	by	
female	state	administration	workers,	university	students	and	sec-
ondary	school	pupils.	In	the	area	of	education,	graduates	of	imam-
hatip	(secondary	schools	whose	curriculum	includes	the	doctrine	
and	history	of	Sunni	Islam	and	the	Arabic	language)	were	allowed	
to	 be	 admitted	 to	 universities,	 and	 their	 number	 has	 radically	
increased	(by	73%	between	2010	and	2014	alone)59.	An	education	
reform	 was	 introduced	 allowing	 students	 to	 be	 transferred	 to	
imam-hatip	schools	after	four	years	of	education	(and	not	eight	as	
had	previously	been	the	case).	Age	restrictions	for	Koranic	course	
participants	 were	 lifted.	 The	 president	 has	 also	 promised	 that	
compulsory	Ottoman	Turkish	language	lessons	will	be	introduced	
into	school	curricula60.	
Diyanet,	which	was	initially	created	as	the	state’s	 tool	 to	control	
religion,	under	the	AKP’s	rule	has	been	used	to	promote	and	ad-
vance	 religion	 using	 public	money.	 Between	 2002	 and	 2013,	Di-
yanet’s personnel	(including	imams)	grew	from	74,000	to	129,000,	
and	the	number	of	mosques	it	sponsors	increased	from	75,000	to	
84,700.	In	2014,	Diyanet’s budget	was	worth	US$2.6	billion	or	the	
equivalent	of	 160%	of	 the	budget	of	 the	Ministry	of	 Internal	Af-
fairs,	 180%	of	 the	Healthcare	Ministry’s	budget	and	340%	of	 the	
59	 Cf.	http://www.turkeyanalyst.org/publications/turkey-analyst-articles/
item/340-looking-strong-but-fragile-a-new-akp-and-a-%E2%80%9Cnew-
turkey%E2%80%9D.html
60	 Cf.	footnote	2.
P
O
IN
T 
O
F 
V
IE
W
  0
5/
20
15
40
budget	of	the	Ministry	for	the	Economy61.	These	moves	have	pro-
voked	allegations	that	the	AKP	is	building	a	missionary	state.	
Another	symbolic	move	is	returning	the	original	function	to	Byz-
antine	 churches	which	had	 functioned	as	mosques	 in	 the	Otto-
man	era	and	had	the	status	of	museums	in	republican	times).	This	
has	 happened	 to	 Hagia	 Sophia	 churches	 in	 Iznik/Nicaea	 (2011)	
and	 Trabzon/Trebizond	 (2013).	 Similar	 speculations	 crop	 up	 on	
a	regular	basis	regarding	the	Hagia	Sophia	basilica	in	Istanbul.	
Only	 some	 of	 the	 actions	 taken	 by	 the	 government	 to	 promote	
conservative	 values,	 including	 Recep	 Tayyip	 Erdogan’s	 wrath-
ful	tirades	on	moral	issues62,	have	translated	into	real	changes	of	
legislation,	but	they	have	significantly	affected	the	atmosphere	of	
public	 life	 in	Turkey.	For	example,	 the	president	has	openly	ap-
pealed	to	the	public	to	strengthen	so-called	‘neighbours’	pressure’	
(mahalle baskısı)	on	people	drinking	alcohol63.
As	 regards	 the	 state	 identity,	 the	Ottoman	Empire	has	not	only	
been	rehabilitated	under	the	AKP’s	rule	(which	seems	to	be	a	nat-
ural	move	after	decades	of	ideologically	motivated	negation),	the	
state	 leaders	 are	 even	 keen	 to	 present	 modern	 Turkey	 as	 pre-
destined	 to	play	 the	role	of	a	neo-Ottoman	power	 that	will	 lead	
Muslims	from	across	the	globe	and	protect	their	rights.	Hence	its	
standing	up	 for	 the	 rights	of	Muslims	 in	Myanmar,	monitoring	
the	respect	of	Muslims’	rights	in	the	EU,	etc.	In	practice,	Turkey’s	
aspirations	to	be	granted	this	status	are	based	on	feeble	grounds,	
and	Ankara’s	policy	towards	the	Middle	East	antagonises	rather	
than	garners	support	for	it	in	the	region	(regardless	of	the	great	
61	 Cf.	http://t24.com.tr/haber/5-bin-imam-ogretmen-oldu,244880,	http://blog.mil-
liyet.com.tr/2014-yili-butcesinin-ayrintilari-belli-oldu/Blog/?BlogNo=440307
62	 For	example,	condemning	abortion,	Caesarean	sections,	immorality	in	TV	
shows,	coeducational	dormitories,	drinking	alcohol	and	smoking,	and	prop-
agating	that	each	family	should	have	at	least	three	children,	etc.	
63	 Cf.	http://www.todayszaman.com//anasayfa_erdogan-calls-for-neighbor-
hood-pressure-against-smokers-alcohol-drinkers_374344.html	
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degree	 of	 enthusiasm	 for	Turkey	 in	 the	Arab	world	 seen	 in	 the	
first	phase	of	the	Arab	Spring	resulting	from	Ankara’s	strong	sup-
port	for	the	changes).
As	regards	history,	 the	AKP	has	made	a	synthesis	of	 the	repub-
lican,	Ottoman-Islamic	and	pan-Turkic	threads,	presenting	them	
in	imperial	terms.	In	its	vision	for	Turkey’s	future	power,	the	gov-
erning	camp	uses	dates	as	landmarks:	2023	(the	100th	anniversary	
of	the	republic),	2053	(the	600th	anniversary	of	the	conquest	of	Con-
stantinople)	and	2071	(the	1000th	anniversary	of	the	Battle	of	Man-
zikert64).	Soldiers	wearing	costumes	from	the	16	historic	‘Turkish’	
empires,	including	the	Hun,	Avar,	Khazar,	Uyghur,	Seljuq,	Tatar,	
Timurid,	Great	Mughal	and	Ottoman	empires	are	part	of	the	cer-
emonial	setting	in	the	Ak	Saray	presidential	complex.	
At	the	same	time,	regardless	of	the	great	changes	in	the	state’s	at-
titude	towards	religion	and	history,	the	AKP	has	never	suggested	
that	the	republic	should	be	abolished	or	that	a	legal	order	based	
on	Islamic	principles	should	be	introduced.	In	the	opinion	of	Serif	
Mardin,	a	highly	respected	Turkish	sociologist,	 this	 is	 linked	to	
the	‘Turkish	uniqueness’	as	compared	to	the	Muslim	world	–	the	
attachment	to	the	ideas	of	the	state.	In	effect,	even	in	the	case	of	
politicians	who	have	a	religious	view	of	the	world,	the	“state	is	one	
millimetre	ahead	of	religion”	–	it	is	a	constant	reality	which	de-
termines	the	framework	of	action65.	The	AKP	leaders’	ambivalent	
attitude	to	the	state	set	up	by	Ataturk	is	presumably	also	an	effect	
of	the	strong	nationalism	characteristic	of	the	greater	part	of	the	
Turkish	public	and	of	the	fact	that	they	owe	their	position	to	the	
social	advancement	which	was	possible	because	of	the	republic’s	
egalitarian	education	policy.	
64	 This	battle	was	fought	in	1071	in	what	is	now	eastern	Turkey	(near	Mus)	be-
tween	the	armies	of	the	Byzantine	Empire	and	the	Great	Seljuq	Empire.	The	
Seljuq	side	won,	and	the	Byzantine	Emperor	Romanos	Diogenes	was	in	cap-
tivity	for	a	short	time.	In	the	longer	perspective,	the	victory	of	Manzikert	
opened	up	the	way	to	Anatolia	for	Seljuq	Turks.	
65	 Cf.	http://www.aawsat.net/2007/12/article55260541
P
O
IN
T 
O
F 
V
IE
W
  0
5/
20
15
42
Vii. the tuRKish public undeR aKp Rule
The	first	period	of	 the	AKP’s	rule	gave	Turkey	10	years	of	social	
peace,	 political	 stability,	 improving	 living	 conditions,	 stronger	
democracy,	and	the	rule	of	law.	This	definitely	made	higher	civi-
lisational	and	political	standards	entrenched	among	the	Turkish	
public.	
The	removal	of	the	Kemalist	ideological	muzzle	has	made	it	pos-
sible	to	express	identities	and	views	which	had	earlier	been	per-
secuted.	 The	 AKP’s	 relatively	 liberal	 rule	 in	 both	 political	 and	
economic	terms	has	offered	various	social	groups	(conservative,	
liberal,	left-wing,	Kurdish,	etc.)	the	opportunity	to	develop	in	ac-
cordance	with	their	own	needs	and	values.	This	accelerated	inter-
nal	differentiation	among	the	Turkish	public,	which	is	a	natural	
process	 in	 a	 democracy.	 Non-governmental	 organisations	 rep-
resenting	 the	whole	 spectrum	of	 views	have	 developed	 rapidly.	
A	strong	conservative-religious	middle	class	has	emerged	which	
is	both	keen	to	use	the	conveniences	offered	by	modern	techno-
logical	solutions	and	proud	of	its	identity	and	live	in	accordance	
with	their	values.	At	the	same	time,	Western	liberal	values	have	
permeated	Turkey	more	strongly	than	ever	before.	
The	removal	of	the	common	denominator	in	the	form	of	the	Ke-
malist	ideology	has	made	the	Turkish	public	more	free	and	diver-
sified,	but	also	less	united	and	more	susceptible	to	political	polari-
sation,	in	particular	as	regards	social	values.	The	non-competitive	
Turkish	political	scene	and	the	serious	restrictions	on	public	de-
bate	have	brought	about	a	 situation	where	 there	 is	no	 indicator	
that	could	reveal	the	Turkish	public’s	preferences	as	regards	poli-
tics	and	their	general	outlook	on	the	world.	Everyday	experience	
and	conclusions	 from	sociological	studies	provide	good	grounds	
both	 for	 the	 statement	 that	 Turks	 are	 becoming	 increasingly	
conservative	and	something	quite	 the	reverse.	For	example,	 the	
Turkish	public	opinion	researcher	Volkan	Ertit	claims	that	even	
though	under	the	state	has	lost	its	secular	nature	under	the	AKP’s	
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rule,	and	external	manifestations	of	attachment	to	Islam	have	be-
come	more	commonplace,	in	fact	the	Turkish	public	are	becoming	
more	and	more	secular	in	terms	of	their	values	and	lifestyle.	This	
is	 an	 effect	 of	 the	 new	 communication	 technologies,	 capitalism	
and	a	rapid	urbanisation66.	
The	AKP’s	retreat	from	the	liberal-democratic	path,	followed	by	
a	 sudden	regress,	 and	 the	policy	of	deliberate	polarisation	have	
made	public	sentiment	very	unstable	and	has	divided	the	public.	
Furthermore,	 the	 culture	 of	 authority,	 hierarchy	 and	 violence,	
which	had	seemingly	been	gradually	ebbing	since	the	beginning	
of	the	21st	century,	has	regained	its	strength.	Although	this	is	im-
possible,	given	the	size	and	the	diversification	of	Turkey’s	popu-
lation,	the	government	is	aiming	to	ideologically	consolidate	the	
Turkish	public	again	using	conservative	and	religious	slogans.	
Civil	society’s	attempt	to	oppose	these	processes,	 the	most	vivid	
example	of	which	were	the	protests	against	the	liquidation	of	Gezi	
Park	 (if	one	disregards	 the	peripheral	purely	hooligan	element)	
was	brutally	pacified.	In	effect,	people	became	discouraged	from	
any	 engagement	 in	 public	 activity	 and	 focused	 on	 their	 private	
lives	instead.	The	Kurdish	minority	who,	as	it	seemed	when	peace	
negotiations	with	the	PKK	began	in	March	2013	were	offered	the	
chance	to	find	their	place	 in	the	newly	defined	Turkish	state,	at	
present	appears	to	be	gradually	detaching	itself	from	Turkey.	Tur-
key’s	political	evolution,	despite	the	still	high	support	for	the	AKP,	
is	 leading	to	a	constant	deterioration	of	public	sentiment	across	
Turkey67.
66	 Cf.	 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=brQcfxHsg6I	 and	 http://www.al-
monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/03/turkey-military-polarization.html	
67	 Data	from	the	Metropoll	opinion	research	centre	suggest	that	in	April	2014,	
45%	of	respondents	believed	that	Turkey	was	generally	heading	in	the	right	
direction,	while	39.6%	were	of	the	opposite	opinion.	In	January	2015,	51.5%	
of	respondents	saw	this	direction	as	wrong	and	36.2%	as	right.	Cf.	https://
twitter.com/metropoll/status/561184853790830592/photo/1.	 The	 swing	 in	
late	 2013/early	 2014	was	 linked	 to	 the	 anti-governmental	 anti-corruption	
operation	conducted	in	December	2013.	
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Viii. conclusions and foRecasts
The	AKP’s	rule	has	changed	Turkey	in	a	strong	and	irreversible	
way.	However,	 it	 is	 still	difficult	 to	predict	how	 the	 situation	
will	 develop	 further,	 since	 90	 years	 on	 from	 the	 founding	 of	
the	republic,	Turkey	in	many	respects	still	appears	to	be	an	un-
finished	experiment.	As	a	consequence	of	 the	AKP’s	 reforms,	
the	republic	which	existed	from	1923	–	a	state	based	on	secular	
government	elites	and	Kemalist	doctrine,	 turning	 its	back	on	
the	Middle	East	and	politically	incompatible	with	the	West	–	no	
longer	exists.	At	the	same	time,	the	achievements	in	building	
a	democratic	state	governed	by	the	rule	of	law	have	to	a	great	
extent	 been	 wasted.	 The	 present	 governance	 structure	 does	
not	comply	with	the	constitution,	and	the	tripartite	division	of	
power	increasingly	appears	to	be	a	fiction.	The	present	Turkish	
state	and	political	system	are	in	fact	based	on	the	will	of	a	sin-
gle	man	whose	power	is	certainly	not	unlimited	but	still	strong	
enough	 not	 to	 meet	 with	 open	 resistance.	 As	 the	 president	
openly	expresses	his	political	and	ideological	preferences,	both	
state	authorities	and	often	even	ordinary	citizens	are	very	ea-
ger	to	track,	stigmatise	and	punish	behaviours	and	statements	
which	fail	to	comply	with	the	conservative	canon	of	values	or	
the	government’s	political	interest.	
It	seems	very	unlikely	that	the	negative	trend	as	regards	democ-
ratisation	and	the	rule	of	law	will	be	reversed	or	even	slow	down	
under	 Erdogan’s	 rule,	 considering	 his	 character,	 the	 scale	 of	
abuse	already	committed	and	the	logic	of	consolidation	of	power.	
However,	Erdogan’s	ambitions	as	regards	the	introduction	of	the	
presidential	system	in	Turkey	may	be	blocked	because	the	AKP	
may	be	unable	to	gain	a	constitutional	majority,	and	because	of	
the	mounting	problems	the	Turkish	government	needs	to	 face:	
economic,	 social	 and	 international.	A	 ‘palace	 coup’,	 i.e.	 the	 re-
moval	of	Erdogan	from	power	in	case	he	becomes	too	great	a	bur-
den	for	the	country,	at	present	seems	very	unlikely,	but	cannot	
be	ruled	out.	
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The	 parliamentary	 election	 scheduled	 for	 June	 2015	 poses	 a	 po-
tential	threat	to	the	AKP’s	monopoly	on	power.	The	AKP	is	doubt-
lessly	bound	to	garner	the	strongest	support	during	the	election.	
However,	the	results	achieved	by	the	other	parties,	above	all	the	
Kurdish	People’s	Democratic	Party	 (HDP),	will	be	of	key	signifi-
cance.	If	this	grouping	succeeds	in	crossing	the	10	per	cent	elec-
toral	threshold	and	enters	parliament	as	the	fourth	political	force,	
the	government	party	will	not	only	fall	short	of	a	constitutional	
majority—it	might	not	even	have	an	ordinary	parliamentary	ma-
jority68;	and	this	would	place	the	AKP	in	a	new	situation	–	the	need	
to	form	a	coalition	after	13	years	of	ruling	the	country	alone.	
At	the	same	time,	more	and	more	facts	indicate	that	Turkey	is	head-
ing	towards	a	turning	point.	The	country	is	achieving	ever	fewer	
successes	at	home	and	on	the	international	arena.	The	government’s	
policy	is	focused	on	protecting	its	power	and	fighting	real	and	im-
agined	enemies.	This	is	accompanied	by	an	increasingly	hysterical	
and	manipulative	propaganda	which	has	grabbed	the	greater	part	
of	the	media	space.	Social	sentiment	is	deteriorating,	and	a	polari-
sation	 of	 views	 is	 escalating.	 Turkey’s	 geographic	 proximity	 and	
involvement	in	the	Syrian	conflict	poses	the	threat	that	instability	
could	spill	 into	Turkey’s	 territory	 (the	Kurdish	population’s	riots,	
the	increasing	presence	of	 Islamic	extremists	and	problems	with	
refugees).	Furthermore,	speculations	that	Erdogan	is	seriously	ill	
(cancer)	have	been	repeated	on	a	regular	basis.	
The	sentiments	among	the	Turkish	public	and	the	condition	of	the	
economy	will	decide	on	the	future	of	the	country.	The	reasons	why	
the	AKP	has	won	and	will	win	elections	in	the	foreseeable	future	
include	 the	 improvement	of	Turks’	 living	 standards	 since	2002,	
the	lack	of	a	political	alternative,	and	the	strength	of	the	party’s	
hard-line	conservative	electorate.	However,	economic	turbulence	
or	a	crisis	might	upset	the	AKP’s	monopoly	on	ruling	the	country.	
68	 Cf.	a	simulation	carried	out	by	the	Turkish	opinion	research	centre	Metro-
poll:	https://twitter.com/nblaser18/status/575000418335506432/photo/1	
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Meanwhile,	it	is	impossible	to	predict	what	condition	the	Turkish	
public	will	be	in	and	what	their	sentiments	and	the	trend	in	possi-
ble	political	choices	will	be	like	when	faced	with	an	economic	and	
political	crisis.	What	is	certain	is	that	the	present	model	of	a	state	
governed	by	a	single	political	force	will	have	a	long-lasting	impact	
on	Turkey,	even	should	the	government	change.
MaReK MatusiaK
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appendix
1. the fethullah gulen Movement (Cemaat)
A	religious,	social	and	political	movement	dating	back	to	the	1970s,	
focused	around	the	Muslim	leader	Fethullah	Gulen	(b.	1941),	who	
has	been	resident	in	the	USA	since	1999.	
Officially,	this	movement	has	no	organisational	structures	and	is	
an	informal	association	of	individuals	and	institutions	following	
Gulen	himself	and	his	teachings.	In	practice,	this	is	a	network	of	
thousands	of	organisations,	institutions	and	companies	scattered	
all	over	the	world	but	acting	in	a	coordinated	way.	Many	members	
of	this	movement	keep	their	involvement	with	it	secret.	
This	movement	has	strong	influence	in	all	spheres	of	public	life	in	
Turkey	For	example	it	has	been	building	influence	in	the	police,	
the	public	prosecution	authorities	and	the	judiciary	since	at	least	
the	1990s69	(to	a	great	extent	through	consistent	and	undercover	
infiltration).	Schools,	universities,	the	media	(including	Turkey’s	
most	popular	Zaman newspaper	and	the	English	language	news-
paper	Today’s Zaman),	 banks,	 companies,	 charities,	non-govern-
mental	organisations,	etc.	are	linked	to	the	Gulen	Movement.	
Education	 is	 one	 of	 the	 movement’s	 pillars	 outside	 Turkey.	 It	
runs	 over	 one	 hundred	 schools	 and	 institutes	 of	 higher	 educa-
tion	worldwide,	including	in	Europe,	Central	Asia,	South-Eastern	
Asia,	Africa	and	also	in	the	USA.	These	are	usually	secular	schools	
offering	high-quality	education	in	English.	
In	 his	 official	 teachings,	 Gulen	 emphasises	 the	 need	 to	 com-
bine	 faith	 with	 modern	 science,	 democracy	 and	 the	 free	 mar-
ket,	and	the	 importance	of	dialogue	between	different	religions	
and	cultures.	In	practice,	the	movement	is	known	for	promoting	
69	 Cf.	https://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09ANKARA1722_a.html	
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conservative	 Muslim	 values	 among	 the	 people	 within	 its	 orbit	
(especially	school	children).	As	a	socio-political	circle,	the	Gulen	
Movement	 has	 for	 years	made	 ruthless	 efforts	 to	maximise	 its	
influence	in	Turkey,	employing	such	methods	as	surveillance,	in-
timidations,	arrests	and	judicial	abuse	(owing	to	its	influence	in	
the	state	apparatus).
The	Gulen	Movement	 formed	an	alliance	with	 the	AKP	 in	2001.	
The	 government	 party	 and	 Prime	 Minister	 Erdogan	 himself	
brought	a	strong	political	mandate	to	this	alliance,	while	the	Gu-
len	 Movement	 brought	 its	 staff	 (state	 administration	 workers	
who	were	its	secret	members)	as	well	as	institutional,	media	and	
financial	support.	Despite	the	historic	(the	AKP	leaders	originate	
from	a	different	political	and	religious	tradition	than	Gulen)	and	
political	differences	(for	example,	the	movement	is	more	moder-
ate	in	criticising	Israel),	these	two	circles	had	the	common	goal	to	
disassemble	the	old	state	establishment.	
The	 movement	 and	 the	 public	 prosecutors	 and	 police	 officers	
linked	to	it,	vested	with	special	powers	by	the	government,	were	
the	driving	force	and	the	executors	of	the	Balyoz	and	Ergenekon	
mass	trials	(see	below)	which	definitively	put	the	final	seal	on	the	
end	of	the	army’s	privileged	position	in	the	Turkish	political	sys-
tem.	As	regards	 this	 issue,	 the	movement	remained	outside	 the	
AKP’s	effective	control,	set	the	tempo	and	the	scale	of	the	process	
of	 calling	 the	 military	 officers	 to	 account,	 and	 often	 surprised	
Prime	Minister	Erdogan	himself	with	its	moves	(for	example,	the	
arrest	of	the	former	head	of	the	general	staff,	Ilker	Basbug	in	2012).
In	exchange	for	the	services	offered	to	the	AKP	government,	Ce-
maat	 gained	 space	 for	 further	 expansion:	 in	 the	 education	 sys-
tem,	in	the	state	apparatus,	etc.	This	movement’s	activity	outside	
Turkey	–	education	and	promotion	of	Turkish	language	teaching	
(including	Turkish	language	competitions	held	on	a	grand	scale)	
–	fitted	in	with	the	building	of	Turkey’s	international	prestige	un-
der	the	AKP’s	rule.	
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The	army	was	gradually	but	nevertheless	consistently	being	sub-
ordinated	to	the	civilian	government,	and	as	such	the	government	
no	longer	viewed	it	as	a	political	threat.	In	turn,	the	Gulen	Move-
ment	 itself,	which	had	an	 independent	position	 in	 the	 state	 ad-
ministration	and	displayed	the	ambition	to	conduct	a	policy	of	its	
own,	was	becoming	a	problem	for	Erdogan.	
Before	the	election	in	2011,	the	prime	minister	removed	the	peo-
ple	who	were	 believed	 to	 have	 links	with	 Gulen	 from	 the	 AKP	
party	lists.	In	autumn	2013,	the	government	decided	to	close	the	
dershane, i.e.	the	private	educational	institutions	which	held	pre-
paratory	courses	 for	university	examinations	 (an	essential	part	
of	around	4,000	dershane	in	the	country	were	linked	to	the	Gulen	
Movement,	and	thus	were	an	important	element	of	its	social	and	
financial	base).
The	Gulen	Movement	first	responded	to	the	attempts	to	restrict	
its	position	in	the	state	in	2012,	with	an	attempt	to	remove	Hakan	
Fidan,	 the	 head	 of	 the	 civilian	 secret	 services	who	 is	 Erdogan’s	
close	aide	(he	was	summoned	to	give	statements	as	a	suspect	in	
a	 case	 launched	 against	 an	 illegal	 Kurdish	 organisation),	 and,	
most	 importantly,	 by	 launching	 the	 anti-corruption	 campaign	
targeted	against	Erdogan	and	his	milieu	in	December	2013.	It	was	
in	fact	an	attempt	to	overthrow	the	government	and	provoked	one	
of	the	most	serious	crises	during	the	AKP’s	rule.	
December	2013	marked	the	beginning	of	determined	efforts	made	
by	Recep	Tayyip	Erdogan	and	Ahmet	Davutoglu,	who	succeeded	
him	 as	 prime	minister,	 to	 completely	 destroy	 the	 Gulen	Move-
ment	 inside	 and	 outside	 Turkey	 (these	 have	 included	 efforts	 to	
have	Gulen	extradited	 from	 the	USA).	Both	 sides	have	used	 the	
state	structures	in	this	struggle.	
In	order	to	deprive	Gulen	of	influence,	the	government	has	held	
massive	staff	purges	and	reshuffles	in	the	police,	military	police	
and	public	prosecution	authorities	(these	have	affected	thousands	
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of	people,	and	have	been	conducted	–	at	least	in	part	–	on	a	random	
basis,	due	to	the	fact	that	membership	in	the	movement	is	secret).	
It	 has	 also	 arrested	 journalists	 representing	 the	 media	 outlets	
linked	to	Gulen	and	has	taken	control	of	the	private	Bank	Asya,	
which	has	connections	with	the	movement.
The	Gulen	Movement,	using	those	of	its	undercover	representa-
tives	who	have	kept	 their	positions	 in	 the	 state	administration,	
including	senior	positions,	has	responded	to	this	by	leaking	infor-
mation	concerning	the	government’s	most	critical	moves	(includ-
ing	plans	to	take	further	measures	against	the	movement)70	and	
has	been	sabotaging	its	policy71.
The	conflict	between	Erdogan	and	the	Gulen	Movement	has	been	
one	of	the	main	pivots	in	Turkey’s	political	life,	and	will	remain	so	
in	the	immediate	future.	It	is	difficult	to	predict	how	it	will	end.	
The	 president	 has	 a	 strong	 political	mandate	 and	 concentrated	
power	 in	 the	 state.	However,	 the	movement	 is	 a	 difficult	 oppo-
nent	to	defeat,	given	the	scale	of	the	dispersal	of	its	influence	and	
its	covert	nature.	This	conflict	has	had	a	devastating	effect	of	the	
Turkish	state.	
2. the arrests on 17 december 2013
On	17	December	2013,	the	police	arrested	49	people	who	had	close	
links	with	the	government	on	charges	of	corruption,	including	the	
sons	of	four	ministers	(including	the	Minister	of	Internal	Affairs)	
and	a	number	of	businessmen	linked	to	the	AKP.	The	charges	in-
cluded	accepting	 large	bribes	 from	Reza	Zarrab,	 a	businessman	
70	 One	of	the	sources	of	the	leaks	is	the	Twitter	account	of	a	user	nicknamed	
Fuat	Avni.	Cf.	https://twitter.com/FuatAvniEng	(English	version).
71	 One	example	of	this	is	the	incident	which	took	place	on	19	January	2014	near	
Adana.	A	convoy	of	trucks	heading	to	Syria	dispatched	by	the	Turkish	in-
telligence	agency	(MIT),	which	according	to	unconfirmed	information	was	
transporting	weapons,	was	stopped	under	the	threat	of	the	use	of	arms	and	
searched	by	the	Turkish	military	police.	Cf.	http://www.aljazeera.com.tr/
haber/mit-tirlari-boyle-durduruldu	
P
O
IN
T 
O
F 
V
IE
W
  0
5/
20
15
51
of	Iranian	origin,	who	acted	as	an	agent	in	illegal	financial	trans-
actions,	bypassing	the	 international	sanctions	 imposed	on	Iran.	
Regardless	of	 the	obvious	 internal	political	context	 (the	conflict	
between	Erdogan	and	the	Gulen	Movement),	 it	appears	that	 the	
suspicions	 that	members	of	 the	government	 elite	have	been	 in-
volved	 in	corruption	seem	to	be	well-grounded.	Telephone	calls	
of	the	most	senior	state	officials,	including	Muammer	Guler,	the	
minister	 of	 internal	 affairs	 (who	 gave	 instructions	 to	 his	 son	
about	what	he	had	to	state	regarding	the	sources	of	cash	found	in	
his	house,	around	US$400,000),	and	above	all	the	conversations	of	
Prime	Minister	Erdogan	with	his	son	Bilal,	were	recorded	using	
wiretapping	and	then	made	available	to	the	general	public	online.	
In	the	fear	that	 the	police	could	search	the	houses	of	his	 family	
members,	 the	 prime	minister	 instructed	 that	 all	 cash	 be	 taken	
away	from	his	son’s	house	and	hidden	(as	can	be	concluded	from	
the	context,	the	cash	belonged	to	Recep	Tayyip	Erdogan	himself),	
and	also	from	the	houses	of	his	brother	and	son-in-law,	and	oth-
ers.	After	a	whole	day	of	intensive	efforts	to	hide	the	money,	Bilal	
Erdogan	informed	his	father	that	only	around	30	million	euros	in	
cash	was	left	to	be	disposed	of72.	
3. ergenekon and balyoz
Ergenekon	and	Balyoz	are	the	codenames	of	the	mass	court	trials	
held	in	2008–2013	and	2010–2012	respectively.	In	total,	254	active	
and	retired	military	officers,	 state	officials,	politicians	and	rep-
resentatives	of	academic	circles	and	the	media	were	sentenced	in	
the	Ergenekon	case.	Almost	20	people	received	life	sentences	(in-
cluding	General	Ilker	Basbug,	who	served	as	chief	of	staff	in	2008–
2010).	 In	the	Balyoz	case,	 the	court	sentenced	325	Turkish	Army	
officers	(including	89	generals	and	admirals;	24	of	them	were	in	
active	service)	to	between	13	and	20	years	in	prison.	
72	 Cf.	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5DQ84uIWYyg&feature=youtu.be
&list=PLmH3I5hKwHWbXLGLueBfiziI4POvuKnhP
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In	 the	 court’s	 opinion,	 those	 sentenced	 in	 the	 Ergenekon	 case	
were	guilty	of	membership	 in	a	 secret	organisation	which,	af-
ter	 the	AKP	 took	power	 in	2002,	had	allegedly	made	efforts	 to	
destabilise	the	situation	in	the	country	(for	example	by	murder-
ing	representatives	of	the	Greek	and	Armenian	minorities)	and	
thus	to	open	the	way	to	a	military	coup.	This	organisation	was	
allegedly	identical	to	the	‘deep	state’.	The	Balyoz	case	concerned	
a	coup	which	was	allegedly	plotted	in	2003	by	a	group	of	Turk-
ish	Army	officers	in	order	to	overthrow	the	newly	elected	AKP	
government.	The	 coup	was	 to	be	preceded	by	 several	 terrorist	
attacks	 staged	 in	 Istanbul	and	 the	 shooting	down	of	a	Turkish	
fighter	airplane	above	the	Aegean	Sea	(which	would	have	been	
blamed	on	Greece).	
Both	 the	 Ergenekon	 and	 Balyoz	 trials	 lacked	 transparency	 and	
involved	large-scale	controversies.	A	substantial	part	of	the	evi-
dence	presented	was	of	poor	quality,	was	inconsistent,	and	raised	
suspicions	of	having	been	fabricated	(for	example,	the	references	
in	the	alleged	conspiracy	documents	of	2003	to	facts	which	took	
place	later,	the	documents	originating	allegedly	from	2003	were	
created	in	a	text	editor	version	introduced	in	2007,	etc.).
The	army’s	hostile	 attitude	 towards	 the	AKP	was	a	 real	 fact	 (as	
late	as	2007,	the	Turkish	General	Staff	in	an	official	memorandum	
suggested	that	it	might	intervene	should	Abdullah	Gul	be	elected	
president).	It	is	also	true	that	the	‘deep	state’	existed	(and	this	fact	
still	remains	to	be	sufficiently	examined).	It	may	be	assumed	on	
the	basis	of	the	knowledge	available	that	some	of	the	hundreds	of	
convicts	could	be	guilty	of	criminal	acts.	
At	 the	 same	 time,	 from	 the	present	perspective,	many	 facts	 in-
dicate	 that	both	Ergenekon	and	Balyoz	were	political	 trials	 and	
formed	an	element	of	the	struggle	between	the	conservative	cir-
cles	on	one	side,	 i.e.	 the	AKP	and	the	Gulen	Movement,	and	the	
secular	state	establishment	on	the	other,	above	all,	the	army.	Both	
the	Ergenekon	organisation	and	the	Balyoz	conspiracy,	according	
P
O
IN
T 
O
F 
V
IE
W
  0
5/
20
15
53
to	facts	known	today,	were	fictitious	and	were	conceived	as	a	col-
lective	instrument	used	to	neutralise	political	and	ideological	op-
ponents73.
One	proof	that	these	were	political	trials	is	found	in	the	fact	that	
once	 the	 confrontation	 between	 the	 AKP	 government	 and	 the	
Fethullah	Gulen	Movement	 escalated,	 a	 large	part	of	 those	 sen-
tenced	 (including	230	 in	 connection	with	 the	Balyoz	 case)	were	
released	from	prison	in	2014	(on	various	legal	grounds).	The	jour-
nalist	 who	was	 the	 first	 to	 publish	 documents	 which	 allegedly	
proved	the	existence	of	the	Balyoz	conspiracy	in	2010	was	arrest-
ed	in	March	201574,	and	President	Erdogan	has	admitted	in	public	
that	he	had	been	misinformed	as	regards	the	Ergenekon	and	Ba-
lyoz	trials	by	a	“parallel	government	structure”,	i.e.	the	Cemaat75.	
73	 Cf.	http://www.isdp.eu/images/stories/isdp-main-pdf/2009_jenkins_be-
tween-fact-and-fantasy.pdf	 and	 https://cdogangercekler.files.wordpress.
com/2014/06/plot-against-the-generals.pdf	(the	author	of	this	text	is	a	pro-
fessor	 at	 Princeton	University	 and	 son-in-law	 of	 one	 of	 the	 generals	 sen-
tenced).
74	 Cf.	http://www.diken.com.tr/baransu-balyoz-belgelerini-altan-congar-
ogur-ve-tayizle-birlikte-inceledik/	
75	 Cf.	http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/we-were-deceived-erdogan-says-
accusing-parallel-structure-of-misinformation.aspx?pageID=238&nID=79
936&NewsCatID=338	
